Lidl lost a chocolate bunny lawsuit in Switzerland

The Swiss Federal Court has issued a ruling in a lawsuit between the well-known chocolate producer Lindt & Sprüngli and the grocery stores chain Lidl.

The case concerns the following chocolate bunny offered by Lidl under trademark Favorina:

This product resembles the famous golden chocolate bunny produced by Lindt & Sprüngli for which the company has the following registered 3D trademark in Switzerland.

Due to this, a lawsuit was initiated.

Taking into account all facts and evidence, the Court found a trademark infringement considering Lidl’s product similar enough in order to create confusion in the public mind. The Court issued an injunction against Lidl and prohibited the store’s chain from producing and distributing copies of the Lindt golden bunny.

According to the Court, the dermoscopic surveys provided by Lindt & Sprüngli proved unquestionably that the shape of the Lindt Gold Bunny has become a trademark through long and intensive market use. What’s more this conclusion does not depend on the color of the product at hand.

The Court dismissed the argument that the available Favorina trademark label on Lidl’s product can distinguish both products in the consumers’ eyes. The reason for this was the fact that consumers do not pay high attention when purchasing foodstuff which means that they can buy a product only based on its recognizable shape without the need to read the mark on it.

Source: Kluwer Trademark Blog

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Lidl won a dispute over lidl-de.website

The well-known German retailer Lidl won a domain name dispute before the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center.

The case concerns a registered domain name for lidl-de.website by an individual. The domain hadn’t been used before the arbitration procedure with exception of a period when there was a website offering a survey dedicated to Lidl and redirecting to third parties websites.

The German company initiated a complaint wanting transfer of the domain to the company because of bad faith registration. In order for such a procedure to be successful the following cumulative factors are necessary:

(i) the Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or a service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and

(ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and

(iii) the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

Lidl submitted many early registered trademarks such as:

– German registration No. 2006134 for LIDL registered on 11 November, 1991;
– German registration No. 30009606 for LIDL registered on 9 March, 2000;
– European Union registration No. 001779784 for 

logo

 registered on 12 November, 2001;
– European Union registration No. 001778679 for LIDL registered on 22 August, 2002;
– European Union registration No. 013192752 for 

logo

 registered on 27 February, 2015;
– International registration No. 748064 for LIDL registered on 26 July, 2000;
– International registration No. 974355 for LIDL registered on 9 May, 2008;

In addition, the company added a family of registered domain names that include lidl.

WIPO concluded that the domain name in dispute is confusingly similar to the earlier trademarks because they are included in the domain entirely. The rest of the domain elements .de and .website are generic and descriptive and are not able to create a difference.

According to Arbitrage, the domain registrant has no legitimate interest to use it because it associates with the business and geographical origin of Lidl as a company.

The domain was registered in bad faith because the registrant was aware of Lidl’s business taking advantage of its reputation.

Source: WIPO.

Husqvarna prevailed over Lidl after a European Court decision

The European Court has ruled in case C-607/19 Husqvarna AB срещу Lidl Digital International GmbH & Co. KG. The case has the following background:

Husqvarna manufactures appliances and tools for gardening and landscaping. It is the proprietor of a three-dimensional EU mark, registered on 26 January 2000 under number 456244 for the goods ‘sprinklers for irrigation’.

From July 2014 until January 2015, Lidl offered for sale a spiral hose set consisting of a spiral hose, a sprinkler nozzle and a coupling sleeve.

Taking the view that the product marketed by Lidl constituted an infringement of its trade mark, Husqvarna brought an action for infringement against Lidl before the Regional Court, Düsseldorf, Germany, for the purposes of, inter alia, bringing the infringement to an end and obtaining damages.

Lidl, by way of counterclaim, requested the revocation of Husqvarna’s rights in the mark at issue in the main proceedings, alleging non-use of that mark.

The Regional Court, Düsseldorf upheld Husqvarna’s claims referred to in paragraph 20 of the present judgment and dismissed Lidl’s counterclaim.

Lidl brought an appeal against the judgment of that court before the Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf, Germany, which, following the last hearing held before it on 24 October 2017, set aside that judgment and declared that Husqvarna’s rights in the mark at issue in the main proceedings were revoked as from 31 May 2017.

In that respect, the Higher Regional Court, Düsseldorf considered that the relevant date, for the purposes of calculating the continuous period of non-use, was not the date on which Lidl had filed its counterclaim, namely in September 2015, but that of the last hearing before that court, which had taken place on 24 October 2017. That court found that the goods protected by the mark at issue in the main proceedings had no longer been marketed as from May 2012 and therefore concluded that, at the date on which the counterclaim for revocation had been filed, the continuous period of five years referred to in Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 had not yet expired, whereas that period had expired as at the date of the last hearing.

Husqvarna brought an appeal on a point of law (Revision) before the referring court, the Federal Court of Justice, Germany.

That court takes the view that the outcome of the dispute before it depends, first, on the question whether the determination of the relevant date for the purposes of calculating the five-year period referred to in Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 is governed by those regulations and, second, should that be the case, on how that date is to be determined.

According to that court, neither Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 nor Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 indicates the relevant date for the purposes of calculating the five-year period of non-use referred to in those provisions, where the request for the revocation of rights in the EU mark concerned is made by way of counterclaim.

In that regard, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) is of the view that that question is a procedural matter and that, in the absence of any clarification in Regulation No 207/2009 and Regulation 2017/1001, it falls within the scope of national law. That court states that that assessment follows from a combined reading of Article 14(3) and Article 101(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 and of Article 17(3) and Article 129(3) of Regulation 2017/1001, as is apparent from the judgment of 22 June 2016, Nikolajeva (C‑280/15, EU:C:2016:467, paragraph 28).

The referring court notes that, according to German civil procedure law, the court must base its decision on all arguments and facts relied on before the date on which the last hearing ends. Where an objection relating to revocation is raised in the course of legal proceedings by way of counterclaim, German trade mark law provides, in the first sentence of Paragraph 25(2) of the MarkenG, that the five-year period within which use must be demonstrated is to be calculated with regard to the date on which the action is brought. However, where the period of non-use comes to an end only after the action has been brought, the relevant date, pursuant to the second sentence of Paragraph 25(2) of the MarkenG, is the date on which the hearing ends. Furthermore, the second sentence of Paragraph 55(3) of the MarkenG provides that, in respect of an application for declaration of invalidity of a trade mark on the ground of the existence of an earlier mark, the proprietor of that earlier mark must, where the defendant has raised an objection, prove that it has been used during the last five years prior to the end of the hearing.

If the answer should be that both Regulation No 207/2009 and Regulation 2017/1001 determine the date with regard to which it must be ascertained whether the five-year period has come to an end, the referring court takes the view that the relevant date should be that of the last hearing before the court hearing the appeal on the merits.

In that regard, the referring court states that that solution is confirmed by recital 24 of Regulation 2017/1001, according to which there is no justification for protecting EU trade marks unless they are actually used. That court adds that taking the date of the last hearing as the relevant date for the purposes of calculating the five-year period of non-use of the EU mark meets the requirement of procedural economy, in that, should that period expire in the course of the proceedings, the party making the counterclaim would not be required to file a new application or counterclaim.

In those circumstances, the Federal Court of Justice decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) In the case of a counterclaim for the revocation of rights in an EU trade mark which was filed prior to the expiry of the five-year period of non-use, is the determination of the date which is relevant for the purposes of calculating the period of non-use in the context of Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 governed by those regulations?

(2) If Question 1 is to be answered in the affirmative: In the case of a counterclaim for the revocation of rights in an EU trade mark which was filed prior to the expiry of the five-year period of non-use referred to in Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, must that period be calculated by taking into account the date on which the counterclaim was filed or the date of the last hearing in the appeal on the merits?’

The Court’s decision:

Article 51(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [European Union] trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that, in the case of a counterclaim for the revocation of rights in an EU mark, the relevant date for the purposes of determining whether the continuous five-year period referred to in that provision has ended is the date on which that counterclaim was filed.