Bentley Motors lost a lawsuit regarding a clothes dispute

bentley-491448_960_720.jpgBentley Motors lost a lawsuit regarding the option to use its Bentley trademarks on clothes.

The case concerns a dispute with almost 20 years of history, where another British company Bentley Clothing has tried to stop this use.

Bentley Clothing is a company that has been selling clothes with the Bentley since 1962, and is the owner of several Bentley for class 25.

On the other side, Bentley Motors in an attempt to expand its merchandising line started to offer beanie hats and scarfs with its brand.

According to the company, by doing that Bentley Motors infringes on the company’s trademark rights.

The English High Court upheld this accusation stating that both marks are very similar due to the leading word element Bentley.

This means that Bentley Motors will have either to stop using the mark for clothes or eventually to sign an agreement with Bentley Clothing.

Source: WIPR.

Patents, pharmaceutical products and compensations

capsule-pill-health-medicine.jpgThe European Court has issued a decision in case C‑688/17 Bayer Pharma AG v Richter Gedeon Vegyészeti Gyár Nyrt., which concerns the following:

On 8 August 2000, Bayer filed an application for a patent relating to a pharmaceutical product containing a contraceptive ingredient at the Szellemi Tulajdon Nemzeti Hivatala (National Intellectual Property Office, Hungary; ‘the Office’). The Office published that application on 28 October 2002.

Richter, in November 2009 and August 2010, and Exeltis, in October 2010, began marketing contraceptive pharmaceutical products in Hungary (‘the products at issue’).

On 4 October 2010, the Office granted Bayer a patent.

On 8 November 2010, Richter filed an application with the Office for a declaration of non-infringement seeking to establish that the products in question did not infringe Bayer’s patent.

On 9 November 2010, Bayer applied to the referring court, the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, Hungary) for provisional measures to prohibit Richter and Exeltis from placing on the market the products at issue. Those applications were rejected on the ground that the plausibility of the infringement had not been demonstrated.

On 8 December 2010, Richter and Exeltis submitted an application for a declaration of invalidity of Bayer’s patent to the Office.

On 25 May 2011, Bayer submitted further applications for provisional measures before the referring court, which, by enforceable orders of 11 July 2011, entering into force on 8 August 2011, prohibited Richter and Exeltis from putting the products in question on the market, and also requiring them to provide guarantees.

On 11 August 2011 Bayer initiated infringement proceedings against Richter and Exeltis before the referring court. Those proceedings were suspended until a final decision is issued in the proceedings for the declaration of the invalidity of Bayer’s patent.

Having heard appeals by Richter and Exeltis against the orders of 11 July 2011, the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Regional Court of Appeal, Hungary), on 29 September and 4 October 2011 respectively, set aside those orders on the grounds of procedural defects and referred the case back to the referring court.

By orders of 23 January 2012 and 30 January 2012, the referring court refused Bayer’s applications for provisional measures. Whilst it took into account that Richter and Exeltis had entered the market in infringement of the patent, the referring court held that, having regard, in particular, to the advanced stage of the proceedings for a declaration of invalidity of Bayer’s patent and for revocation of an equivalent European patent, the adoption of such measures could not be deemed to be proportionate. By decision of 3 May 2012, the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Regional Court of Appeal) upheld those two orders.

By decision of 14 June 2012, the Office granted in part the application for a declaration of invalidity in respect of Bayer’s patent submitted by Richter and Exeltis. Following a further application by Richter and Exeltis, the Office withdrew its decision of 14 June 2012 and, by decision of 13 September 2012, declared that patent invalid in its entirety.

By order of 9 September 2014, the referring court set aside the Office’s decision of 13 September 2012. It also varied the Office’s decision of 14 June 2012 and declared Bayer’s patent invalid in its entirety.

By order of 20 September 2016, the Fővárosi Ítélőtábla (Budapest Regional Court of Appeal) upheld that order.

On 3 March 2017, the referring court terminated the infringement proceedings between Bayer and Exeltis following Bayer’s withdrawal from those proceedings.

By decision of 30 June 2017, the referring court definitively dismissed the claim for infringement brought by Bayer against Richter on the grounds of Bayer’s patent having been definitively declared invalid.

Richter, by a counterclaim brought on 22 February 2012, and Exeltis, by a counterclaim lodged on 6 July 2017, requested that Bayer be ordered to provide compensation for the losses they claim to have suffered as a result of the provisional measures referred to in paragraph 21 of the present judgment.

Before the referring court, Bayer submitted that those claims should be rejected, arguing that Richter and Exeltis themselves caused the losses they claim to have suffered by having intentionally and unlawfully placed the products in question on the market. In accordance with Article 340(1) of the Civil Code, there is therefore no justification for their claim for compensation for these losses.

In that context, the referring court considers, in essence, that, in the absence of any provision in Hungarian law specifically governing the situations referred to in Article 9(7) of Directive 2004/48, the general rules of the Civil Code relating to liability and compensation must be interpreted in the light of that provision. However, the referring court first raises questions regarding the scope of the rule contained in Article 9(7) of that directive and asks, in particular, whether that provision merely guarantees the defendant a right to compensation or whether it also defines the content of that right. Secondly, the referring court asks whether Article 9(7) of that directive precludes the national court, applying a provision of the civil law of a Member State, from examining the defendant’s role in the losses occurring.

In those circumstances, the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, Hungary) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘1.  Should the expression ‘provide … appropriate compensation’ referred to in Article 9(7) of Directive [2004/48/EC], be interpreted to mean that Member States must establish the substantive rules of law on the liability of parties and the amount and method of compensation, by virtue of which the courts of the Member States can order applicants to compensate defendants for losses caused by measures which the court subsequently revoked or which subsequently lapsed due to an act or omission by the applicant, or in cases in which the court has subsequently found that there was no infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right?

2. If the answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling is in the affirmative, does Article 9(7) of [Directive 2004/48/EC] preclude opposition to the legislation of a Member State by virtue of which the rules to be applied to the compensation referred to in that provision of the Directive are the general rules of that Member State on civil liability and compensation according to which the court cannot oblige the applicant to provide compensation for losses caused by a provisional measure which was subsequently held to be unfounded due to the invalidity of the patent, and which were incurred as a result of the defendant’s failure to act as would generally be expected in the circumstances in question, or losses for which the defendant is responsible for that same reason, provided that, when requesting the provisional measure, the applicant acted as would generally be expected in those circumstances?’

The Court’s decision:

Article 9(7) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, in particular, the concept of ‘appropriate compensation’ referred to in that provision, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which provides that a party shall not be compensated for losses which he has suffered due to his not having acted as may generally be expected in order to avoid or mitigate his loss and which, in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, results in the court not making an order for provisional measures against the applicant obliging him to provide compensation for losses caused by those measures even though the patent on the basis of which those had been requested and granted has subsequently been found to be invalid, to the extent that that legislation permits the court to take due account of all the objective circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the parties, in order, inter alia, to determine that the applicant has not abused those measures.

Where a trademark lawsuit has to be initiated in case of online sales in the EU?

buy-3692440_960_720.jpgThe European Court has ruled in case C‑172/18 AMS Netve Ltd, Barnett Waddingham Trustees, Mark Crabtree v Heritage Audio SL, Pedro Rodríguez Arribas. This case concerns the territory where a trademark lawsuit has to be initiated in case of online sales. In details:

AMS Neve is a company established in the United Kingdom which manufactures and sells audio equipment. BW Trustees, also established in the United Kingdom, is the trustee of the AMS Neve executive pension scheme. Mr Crabtree is a director of AMS Neve.

Heritage Audio is a company established in Spain which sells and supplies audio equipment. Mr Rodríguez Arribas, who is domiciled in Spain, is the sole director of Heritage Audio.

On 15 October 2015 AMS Neve, BW Trustees and Mr Crabtree brought an action against Heritage Audio and Mr Rodríguez Arribas before the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court (United Kingdom) claiming infringement of an EU trade mark of which BW Trustees and Mr Crabtree are the proprietors and for the use of which AMS Neve is exclusively licensed.

Their action concerns, in addition, the alleged infringement of two marks registered in the United Kingdom of which BW Trustees and Mr Crabtree are also the proprietors.

The EU trade mark relied on consists of the figure 1073 and was registered for goods within Class 9 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended. The description of the goods covered is in part as follows: ‘sound studio recording, mixing and processing equipment’.

The defendants in the main proceedings are alleged to have offered for sale to consumers in the United Kingdom imitations of goods of AMS Neve bearing a sign that is identical or similar to that EU trade mark and to the national trade marks or referring to that sign, and to have advertised those products.

The applicants in the main proceedings have submitted documents in support of their action, including the contents of the Heritage Audio website and the latter’s Facebook and Twitter accounts, an invoice issued by Heritage Audio to an individual residing in the United Kingdom and correspondence between Heritage Audio and a person established in the United Kingdom concerning possible deliveries of audio equipment.

The applicants in the main proceedings have in particular submitted screenshots from that website on which they claim appeared offers to sell audio equipment bearing a sign identical or similar to that EU trade mark. They have stressed that the offers for sale are worded in English and that a section headed ‘where to buy’ lists distributors established in various countries, including the United Kingdom. Further, they claim that it is apparent from the general sale conditions that Heritage Audio accepts orders from any EU Member State.

The defendants in the main proceedings pleaded that the court before which the action was brought had no jurisdiction.

While the defendants do not deny that Heritage Audio products might have been purchased, in the United Kingdom, through other companies, they assert that they have not, themselves, either advertised in the United Kingdom or made any sales in that Member State. They further assert that they have never appointed a distributor for the United Kingdom. Last, they contend that the content displayed on the Heritage Audio website and on the platforms to which the applicants in the main proceedings refer was, by the time of the period covered by the infringement action, obsolete and ought not therefore to be taken into account.

By judgment of 18 October 2016, the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the infringement action in so far as that action is based on the EU trade mark at issue.

That court states that the applicants in the main proceedings submitted evidence capable of proving that the Heritage Audio website was directed to, inter alia, the United Kingdom. That court considers, further, that the facts of the dispute before it enable it to find that Mr Rodríguez Arribas is jointly liable for the acts of Heritage Audio and that the courts of the United Kingdom have jurisdiction to hear the case in so far as that dispute concerns the protection of national intellectual property rights.

The Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court considers, on the other hand, that that dispute, in so far as it concerns infringement of the EU trade mark, is subject, in accordance with Article 97(1) of Regulation No 207/2009, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member State in whose territory the defendant is domiciled, in this case the Kingdom of Spain. The Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court adds that the jurisdiction of the Spanish courts also stems from Article 97(5) of that regulation, under which infringement actions may also be brought before the courts of the Member State in whose territory the act of infringement has been committed.

As regards the latter provision, the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court considers that the court which has territorial jurisdiction to hear an action brought by the proprietor of a mark against a third party that has used signs identical or similar to that mark in advertising and offers for sale on a website or on social media platforms is the court with jurisdiction over the place where the third party decided to place that advertising or to offer for sale products on that site or on those platforms and took steps to give effect to that decision.

The applicants in the main proceedings brought an appeal against that judgment before the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division).

The referring court considers that the court of first instance, while referring in its judgment to certain judgments of the Court, such as those of 19 April 2012, Wintersteiger (C‑523/10, EU:C:2012:220), and of 5 June 2014, Coty Germany (C‑360/12, EU:C:2014:1318), misinterpreted those judgments and the case-law of the Court in general.

The referring court is of the opinion that such an interpretation would lead, in essence, to a finding that ‘the Member State in which the act of infringement has been committed’, within the meaning of Article 97(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, is the Member State in which the defendant set up its website and its social media accounts. According to the referring court, it follows, however, from the wording, purpose and context of that provision that the territory of the Member State subject to that provision is that in which the consumers or traders to whom the advertising and offers for sale are directed are resident.

The referring court adds that the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), in its ‘Parfummarken’ judgment of 9 November 2017 (I ZR 164/16), held that the interpretation of the wording ‘law of the country in which the act of infringement was committed’, in Article 8(2) of Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ 2007 L 199, p. 40), adopted in the judgment of 27 September 2017, Nintendo (C‑24/16 and C‑25/16, EU:C:2017:724), can be transposed to Article 97(5) of Regulation No 207/2009. However, the referring court has some doubts with regard to that finding of the Bundesgerichtshof.

In those circumstances, the Court of Appeal (England & Wales) (Civil Division) decided to stay proceedings and to refer to the Court the following question for a preliminary ruling, adding in its decision that that question concerns the interpretation of Article 97(5) of Regulation No 207/2009:

‘In circumstances where an undertaking is established and domiciled in Member State A and has taken steps in that territory to advertise and offer for sale goods under a sign identical to an EU trade mark on a website targeted at traders and consumers in Member State B:

(i)  does an EU trade mark court in Member State B have jurisdiction to hear a claim for infringement of the EU trade mark in respect of the advertisement and offer for sale of the goods in that territory?

(ii)  if not, which other criteria are to be taken into account by that EU trade mark court in determining whether it has jurisdiction to hear that claim?

(iii)  in so far as the answer to (ii) requires that EU trade mark court to identify whether the undertaking has taken active steps in Member State B, which criteria are to be taken into account in determining whether the undertaking has taken such active steps?’

The Court’s decision:

Article 97(5) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the [European Union] trade mark must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a European Union trade mark who considers that his rights have been infringed by the use without his consent, by a third party, of a sign identical to that mark in advertising and offers for sale displayed electronically in relation to products that are identical or similar to the goods for which that mark is registered, may bring an infringement action against that third party before a European Union trade mark court of the Member State within which the consumers or traders to whom that advertising and those offers for sale are directed are located, notwithstanding that that third party took decisions and steps in another Member State to bring about that electronic display.

Bacardi won a case in Turkey for a trademark that has been never used there

pexels-photo-1571849Mutlu Köse published an interesting article for Marques Class 46 which discusses the court practice in Turkey regarding cases of non-use of trademarks.

The dispute at hand concerns a lawsuit initiated by Bacardi against a local beverage producer for a trademark infringement of BREEZER mark owned by the company.

The Turkey company uses similar sign FREEZER and look-alike packaging.

As a response, KIRBIYIK FREEZER started revocation proceeding against Bacardi’s BREEZER mark for lack of genuine use in the country for a period of 5 years as it is stipulated by the law.

Bacardi had never used its trademark but the reason for this was the fact that the Turkish regulations do not allow the sale of cocktail beverages containing distilled alcohols.

According to the Court, however, this represented a valid reason for non-use of the registered mark (the onliest option for overcoming such revocation apart from actual use) and dismissed the Turkish company request. At the same time, the court accepted the claims for trademark infringement and unfair competition against KIRBIYIK FREEZER.

Lacoste lost a crocodile case in Nederland

The Hague District Court ruled in a lawsuit between Lacoste and Hema, which concerns a children’s underwear with a crocodile motif.


According to Lacoste, Hema infringed the rights over their registered trademarks, which above all is well-known amongst the consumers.


The Court, however, disagreed with Lacoste stating that there was no infringement in the case at hand because the use of a repetitive crocodile pattern was perceived as a decoration, not as a source of origin. The practice of using animal depictions for children’s clothing is widespread.

Lacoste claimed that confusion could be created due to the fact that their trademarks have had a reputation on the market for many years. In addition, a survey was been provided, in which many respondents stated that they connect crocodile depictions with the Lacoste’s trademark.

The Court dismissed this evidence because the questions in the survey were leading, making respondents think about trademarks. On top of that, the relevant public wasn’t defined correctly.

According to Lacoste, some of the clothes contained only one depiction of crocodile which made even easier for the consumers to make a connection with their trademark.

The Court disagreed for this too, concluding that this cloth had been selling in a package with others and only in the Hema’s stores so the relevant consumers would not be confused neither be able to connect it with the Lacoste’s trademarks.

Source: AKD NV – Bram Woltering, Lexology.

Apple lost a lawsuit against Pear in the EU

fruit-2637058_960_720.jpgApple Inc. lost an interesting lawsuit before the General Court of the European Union regarding its famous trademark logo. The case at hand concerns an attempt by the Chinese company Pear Technologies Ltd to register the following European trademark:

download.pngFor classes of goods and services:

 Class 9: ‘Personal computers; laptop computers; handset and tablet mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls and/or any digital data and for use as a handheld computer; apparatus for recording, transmission or reproduction of sound or images; videophones, video-tablets, pre-recorded computer programs for personal information management, database management software, electronic mail and messaging software, paging software, computer hardware, software and firmware, namely operating system programs, application development computer software programs for personal and handheld computers or handheld mobile digital electronic devices; computer, handheld and mobile handset device peripherals products; parts, fittings and accessories for all the aforesaid goods’;

Class 35: ‘Providing consultancy on digital marketing; providing CRM solution and business solution design services’;

Class 42: ‘Maintenance and updating of computer software; providing information concerning computer software via the internet and other computer and electronic communication networks; computer network services; providing consultancy on networking, webpage design; providing server hosting services; providing domain management services; provision of software applications for handheld, tablets, personal computer and laptop computer devices and data centre management; technical consultancy; all aforesaid services also as business to business and all aforesaid services also as business to consumer or consumers’.

Against this application an opposition was filed by Apple on the ground of its following earlier figurative trademark:

download (1).png

For classes of goods and services:

Class 9: ‘… Computers, tablet computers, computer terminals, computer peripheral devices; computer hardware; … digital music and/or video players; MP3 and other digital format audio players; … handheld and mobile digital electronic devices for the sending and receiving of telephone calls; … computer software for use in connection with online music subscription service, software that enables users to play and program music and entertainment-related audio, video, text and multi-media content, software featuring musical sound recordings, entertainment-related audio, video, text and multi-media content, computer software and firmware for operating system programs, data synchronization programs, and application development tool programs for personal and handheld computers; … computer hardware and software for providing integrated telephone communication with computerised global information networks; electronic handheld devices for the wireless receipt, storage and/or transmission of data and messages, and electronic devices that enable the user to keep track of or manage personal information; software for the redirection of messages, Internet e-mail, and/or other data to one or more electronic handheld devices from a data store on or associated with a personal computer or a server …’;

Class 35: ‘… Retail store and online store services in the field of entertainment featuring music, video, … musical works, pre-recorded audio and audio-visual works and related merchandise, and music related electronic products, via the Internet and other computer, electronic and communications networks …’;

Class 42: ‘… Application service provider (ASP) services featuring software for use in connection with online music subscription service, software that enables users to play and program music and entertainment-related audio, video, text and multimedia content, and software featuring musical sound recordings, entertainment-related audio, video, text and multimedia content; providing temporary internet access to use on-line non-downloadable software to enable users to program, audio, video, text and other multimedia content, including music, concerts, videos, radio, television, news, sports, games, cultural events, and entertainment-related programs …’

Initially, the EUIPO upheld the opposition, the main argument for which was the proved reputation of Apple’s trademark among the consumers in the EU.

In the appeal, however, The General Court annulled this decision stating that EUIPO erred in its assessment. The reasons for this conclusion were that even though Apple’s sign has a reputation, which broadens its protection scope, this can be an argument only in a case that both trademarks are phonetically, visually and conceptually similar.  In the case at hand, this is not true.

  In that regard, it should be noted, first, that it is admittedly true that each of the conflicting marks may be described as using the image of a fruit. However, as all the parties to this action also argue, the mere fact that there is a generic term which includes the terms used to describe the semantic content of the marks at issue is not a relevant factor in the context of the conceptual comparison. In the same vein, it should be borne in mind that the examination of the similarity takes into consideration the conflicting marks as they have been registered or as they have been applied for. Accordingly, it should be observed that the conflicting marks evoke the concept of ‘fruit’ only in an indirect manner. It follows from the considerations set out in paragraphs 62 and 63 above that the conflicting marks will not be perceived as depicting two unidentifiable fruits, but rather as (i) an apple with a bite taken out of it, possessing a leaf, and (ii) a pear with a stem. In those circumstances, it is inconceivable that the relevant public displaying a high level of attention will use the term ‘fruit’ instead of ‘pear’ or ‘apple’ when referring to the conflicting marks.

  Next, it should be borne in mind that, according to the case-law cited in paragraphs 22 and 61 above, the comparison of the conflicting marks must be based on the overall impression given by them, by reference to the intrinsic qualities of those marks, and, moreover, conceptual similarity arises from the fact that both marks use images with a similar semantic content. These considerations counter the taking into account of factors such as those mentioned in paragraph 32 of the contested decision, which are not based on the perception of the semantic content of the images used by the conflicting marks, as they have been registered or as they have been applied for, but which are distant from the actual depiction of them. The protection which is granted to an earlier figurative mark does not apply, in the absence of commonalities with the depiction of the mark cited in opposition, to the general category of phenomena that it depicts. The Board of Appeal was therefore wrong to take the view that the marks at issue could be regarded as being conceptually similar on the sole ground that the fruits which they depicted shared several characteristics in real life.

Case T‑215/17, Pear Technologies Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

BMW won a lawsuit regarding its Mini Cooper brand

red-84593_960_720BMW won a lawsuit in Germany against the Chinese company Ninebot which offer electric scooters.

The case concerns an advertisement spot for the Ninebot’s scooter which includes among other a Mini Cooper car producing by BMW.

According to the German company, this was unfair trade practice because, first of all, Ninebot had no permission to include the Mini Cooper brand in the spot, and secondly, by doing that the company took unfair advantages from the longstanding Mini Cooper’s reputation on the market.

The court went along with BMW, accepting that the Mini Cooper brand was exposed clearly and in a non-descriptive manner in the advertisement.

Source: WIPR.