Aldi won a dispute over alcoholic beverages and its trademark in the EU

The General Court of the European Union has ruled in the case T‑429/21 Aldi Einkauf SE & Co. OHG v Cantina sociale Tollo SCA.

In 2018, Cantina successfully registered an EU trademark for ALDIANO in class 33 – alcoholic beverages (excluding beers).

An invalidation proceeding followed, initiated by the German retail chain Aldi based on two earlier marks for ALDI in classes 33 and 35.

Because these earlier marks had been registered for more than 5 years, as a counter-attack, Cantina requested proof of genuine use.

EUIPO considered the invalidation request only based on one of the earlier marks, that was registered for class 35. The Office concluded that the mark’s use was dully proved by Aldi taking into account that the store sells not only foods but alcoholic beverages too. In addition, the Office found both signs similar enough.

An appeal followed where the Board of Appeal annulled the earlier decision finding the proof of use as insufficient. The earlier Aldi’s mark for class 35 covered only the general term retailing in all product areas, and there was no sufficient evidence that the mark was used for alcoholic beverages t in particular.

It must be noted that, while it is true that the Court of Justice has held that, for the purposes of registration of a trade mark covering services provided in connection with retail trade, it is not necessary to specify in detail the service or services for which that registration is sought, the applicant must, however, be required to specify the goods or types of goods to which those services relate (judgment of 7 July 2005, Praktiker Bau- und Heimwerkermärkte, C‑418/02, EU:C:2005:425, paragraphs 49 and 50).

However, first, the Court has stated that the line of authority derived from that judgment concerned only applications for registration as trademarks and did not concern the protection of trademarks registered at the date of that judgment’s delivery. Since, in the present case, the earlier mark, relied on by the applicant in support of its application for a declaration of invalidity, was registered before the date of delivery of the judgment of 7 July 2005, Praktiker Bau- und Heimwerkermärkte (C‑418/02, EU:C:2005:425), it was not, in any event, concerned by the obligation arising from that judgment.

Secondly, it cannot be inferred from the considerations of that judgment that, when a trademark covering retail services, registered after that judgment’s delivery – which is the case with the earlier registration – is relied on in support of a ground for invalidity referred to in Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, that ground may be rejected from the outset, simply by invoking the absence of any precise statement of the goods to which the retail services covered by the earlier mark may relate.

Lastly, it must be further stated that proof of genuine use of the earlier mark and of the earlier registration is one of the ways to determine the precise goods covered by the retail services for which those goods were registered.

The Board of Appeal therefore erred in finding that it was for the very broad specification of retail trade in all product areas that the applicant had to prove genuine use of the earlier mark. That error affects the contested decision and constitutes a sufficient basis for annulling it as regards the earlier mark for the services in Class 35.

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When Yoga can be a serious threat to trademark protection in the EU?

The General Court of the European Union has ruled in the case Case T‑443/21 YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance v Swami Vidyanand.

This dispute focuses our attention on the issue of trademarks with a weak distinctive character and how this reflects on the scope of their protection.

In 2018, Mr. Swami Vidyanand filed the following international trademark where the EU was designated party, for class 41 – Education; providing of training; entertainment; sporting and cultural activities:

Against this application, an opposition was filed by YAplus DBA Yoga Alliance on the grounds of the following earlier mark in classes 35, 41, 42:

On 2 April 2020, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition. It found, in essence, first, that the services at issue were identical or similar and that they were aimed both at the general public and at professionals with an average level of attention, second, that the comparison of the signs had to be made from the point of view of non-English-speaking Czech-, Greek-, Croatian-, Hungarian- and Polish-speaking consumers in the European Union and that the signs were visually similar to an average degree, highly similar phonetically and conceptually similar to a low degree. Third, it found that the distinctive character of the earlier mark was normal despite the presence within it of certain elements, at most weakly distinctive, such as their decorative elements or the common word element ‘yoga’. Lastly, it found that there was a likelihood of confusion on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.

An appeal followed where the Board of Appeal annulled the Opposition Division finding no likelihood of confusion between both signs.

The General Court upheld this finding. According to the Court:

It follows that excessive protection of marks consisting of elements which, as in the present case, have very weak distinctive character, if any, in relation to the services at issue could adversely affect the attainment of the objectives pursued by trademark law, if, in the context of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the mere presence of such elements in the signs at issue led to a finding of a likelihood of confusion without taking into account the remainder of the specific factors in the present case.

It should be remembered that the visual, phonetic, or conceptual aspects of the signs at issue do not always have the same weight and it is appropriate, in that global assessment, to take into account the nature of the services at issue and to examine the objective conditions under which the marks may appear on the market.

Thus, in accordance with the case-law, in the present case, it must be held that, in view of the fact that the phonetic and conceptual similarities are based exclusively on word elements which are devoid of distinctive character, the clear visual differences between them have a greater impact in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, where the earlier trademark and the sign whose registration is sought coincide in an element that is weakly distinctive with regard to the goods at issue, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 does not often lead to a finding that such likelihood exists.

In those circumstances, it must be held that, in the context of a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, having regard to the weak distinctive character of the common elements ‘yoga alliance’, the presence of figurative elements which are visually very different will enable the average consumer to make a clear distinction between the marks at issue, even for the part of the relevant public with an average level of attention, despite the identical or similar character of the services at issue. That is all the more true for the part of the relevant public with an above-average level of attention. Accordingly, it follows that the Board of Appeal’s error in relation to the level of attention of the relevant public in respect of the ‘educational’ services found in paragraph 50 above cannot have a decisive effect on the outcome of the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.

This case reminds us what a trap can be if someone uses a weak distinctive element as a trademark. Although such an element can be registered in combination with graphics or other words, by its nature it is weak which means that monopolization of this element is not possible. This in turn means that competitors can use it too for their brands, and all of this means potential marketing and recognisability issues for the trademark owner.

How an abstract canine depiction reflects a trademark opposition in the EU?

The General Court of the European Union has ruled in the case T‑596/21 Société Elmar Wolf v Fuxtec GmbH.

The case concerns the similarity between figurative marks based on the meaning they can convey to the consumers.

Fuxtec GmbH is the owner of the following international mark, where the EU is designated, for classes 4, 7, 8, 12, and 35:

Against this mark, an opposition was filed by Société Elmar Wolf based on several earlier figurative marks in classes 7, 8, and 35:

The EUIPO dismissed the opposition finding both signs dissimilar. The case was appealed.

The General Court upheld the EUIPO decision entirely. According to the Court, the earlier marks convey a clear impression of canine while the later mark is rather abstract, as a result of its clean curved lines, its sharp edges, and the lack of figurative details.

Due to this fact, consumers would need to put more effort and thoughts in order to discover the meaning of the sign if this is possible at all. This prevents the possibility of consumer confusion.

By contrast, as the Board of Appeal pointed out, the shape exhibited by the contested sign is rather abstract, as a result of its clean curved lines, its sharp edges and the lack of figurative details. It is true that that sign includes elements which could be perceived by a non-negligible part of the relevant public as the contours of the front view of a face, ears pointing upwards, a muzzle pointing downwards and eyes. However, the representation of a head which may emerge is obviously less realistic and considerably more stylised than the silhouette illustrated by the earlier marks, which represents some of the favourite attributes, a slightly open mouth and a menacing expression, of the representation of the head of a canine and which the rather abstract silhouette in the mark applied for does not have. In those circumstances, it is unlikely that the average consumer, who normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not carry out an analysis of its details at the time of purchase, will be capable of spontaneously associating the contested sign with the head of an animal, or even with the head of a canine, without engaging in an analysis which goes beyond that expected at the time of purchase.

It follows that it must be held, as the Board of Appeal found, that the overall impression created by the contested sign makes the identification of the head of an animal, let alone of a particular animal, highly arbitrary and, consequently, that the signs at issue are visually similar at most to a low degree.

The argument of the opposition applicant that the earlier marks have a high degree of inherent distinctiveness because they do not convey any meaning in relation to the goods and services covered by them, was dismissed by the Court, which considers that such consideration is not enough a high level of distinctiveness to be proved.

Rolex lost a trademark dispute in the EU

Are clothes similar enough to watches – that’s the question The General Court of the European Union has ruled in recently  T‑726/21 Rolex SA v PWT A/S.

PWT filed a European trademark application for the following figurative mark for many classes including class 25 – clothing, footwear headgear:

Against this application an opposition was filed by Rolex SA based on the following trademarks in class 14 – watches, for which an established reputation was claimed:

The EUIPO decided that the goods in class 14 – watches and those in class 25 clothing, footwear headgear are not similar because of their different nature and intended purpose. While watches are perceived as accessories, the goods in class 25 aim to dress the human body.

In so far as the opposition was based on Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, it found that the reputation of the earlier purely figurative mark was not established and that the reputation of the earlier composite mark was established for wristwatches. It added that the latter mark and the mark applied for were, at most, visually similar to a very low degree, that a phonetic comparison was not possible between them, and that the conceptual similarity resulting from the common presence of a crown had a very limited impact. It inferred from this that the relevant public would not make a link between those marks, with the result that no risk of injury to the reputation of the earlier composite mark was established.

The General Court upheld this decision entirely. Regarding the goods similarity issue:

In the present case, the applicant merely alleges the growing importance of online trade, the growing tendency towards convergence of fashion and technology, including wristwear, and the supposed well-known fact, common in the fashion sector and usual for consumers, of seeing clothing and accessories, such as eyewear, jewelry and watches, being offered in the same sales outlets. However, it does not submit any evidence to that effect. The applicant adds that that practice results in a certain cognitive behavior and a certain state of mind, but without providing further detail.

In addition, it must be pointed out that the fact that the goods at issue may be sold in the same commercial establishments, such as department stores, is not particularly significant, since very different kinds of goods may be found in such shops, without consumers automatically believing that they have the same origin

Furthermore, the applicant’s arguments that the purchase of the goods at issue may be based on the search for an aesthetic complementarity must be rejected as ineffective. The applicant itself concedes that such a fact is insufficient to conclude that there is a similarity between those goods.

When it comes to the claimed reputation:

In order to benefit from the protection introduced by the provisions of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, the proprietor of the earlier mark must, first of all, adduce proof, either that the use of the mark applied for would take unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, or that it would be detrimental to that distinctive character or that repute.

In that regard, although the proprietor of the earlier trade mark is not required to demonstrate actual and present injury to its mark for the purposes of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, it must, however, prove that there is a serious risk that such an injury will occur in the future.

The Board of Appeal noted that, in order to demonstrate the existence of one of the types of injury referred to in Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, the applicant had not submitted observations to it, but that, before the Opposition Division, it had argued that the intervener could take unfair advantage of the degree of recognition of the earlier composite mark on account of the fact that the signs at issue were almost identical and the immense reputation acquired by the earlier marks, which allegedly convey images of prestige, luxury and an active lifestyle. It found that, by those arguments, the applicant had in fact merely referred to the wording of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009, without submitting any coherent arguments as to why one of such injuries would occur. The Board of Appeal inferred from this that no injury referred to in that provision was established.

It must be stated at the outset that the applicant’s arguments do not make it possible to identify the injury or injuries set out in Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009 which might be caused to the earlier composite mark, to its detriment, by the use of the mark applied for.

Source: IPKat.

Can you rebrand medicines in the EU – a European Court decision

The European Court has ruled in joined cases C‑253/20 and C‑254/20 Impexeco NV v Novartis AG which target the issue of pharmaceutical products rebranding and parallel importation. The cases have the following background:

Case C‑253/20

Novartis developed a medicinal product with the active substance letrozole, marketed in Belgium and the Netherlands under the EU trademark ‘Femara’, of which Novartis is the proprietor.

That medicinal product is sold on the market in packages of 30 and 100 film-coated tablets of 2.5 mg in Belgium, and in packages of 30 film-coated tablets of 2.5 mg in the Netherlands.

Sandoz BV and Sandoz NV, respectively in the Netherlands and in Belgium, market the generic medicinal product ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’, in packages of 30 film-coated tablets in the Netherlands, and 30 and 100 film-coated tablets in Belgium.

According to the referring court, the medicinal products marketed under the names ‘Femara’ and ‘Letrozol Sandoz’ are identical.

By letter of 28 October 2014, Impexeco informed Novartis of its intention to import from the Netherlands and to place on the Belgian market, from 1 December 2014, the medicinal product ‘Femara 2.5 mg x 100 tablets (letrozol)’. It is apparent from the order for reference that that medicinal product was, in actual fact, the medicinal product ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’, repackaged in new outer packaging to which Impexeco intended to affix the trade mark ‘Femara’.

By letter of 17 November 2014, Novartis opposed the parallel import planned by Impexeco, claiming that a new marking of that product with the trade mark of the reference medicinal product produced by Novartis, that is to say, the trade mark ‘Femara’, constituted a manifest infringement of its rights in that mark and was likely to mislead the public.

In July 2016, Impexeco marketed in Belgium the medicinal product ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’, repackaged in new packaging bearing the trade mark ‘Femara’.

According to the referring court, the public price of the medicinal products ‘Femara (Novartis) 2.5 mg’, ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’ and ‘Femara (Impexeco) 2.5 mg’ are identical in Belgium. By contrast, the public price of ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’ is significantly lower in the Netherlands.

Claiming that the marketing referred to in paragraph 19 above infringed its trade mark rights, on 16 November 2016, Novartis brought an action against Impexeco before the Court of Cessations, Brussels, Belgium.

By letter of 10 April 2017, Impexeco also informed Novartis of its intention to market in Belgium the medicinal product ‘Femara 2.5 mg’ in packaging of 30 film-coated tablets imported from the Netherlands and re-labelled. It is apparent from the order for reference that that medicinal product was the medicinal product ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’ and that Impexeco intended to re-label that product and to affix the trade mark ‘Femara’ to it.

Case C‑254/20

Novartis developed a medicinal product with the active substance methylphenidate. Novartis Pharma NV markets that medicinal product in Belgium under the Benelux word mark ‘Rilatine’, of which it is the proprietor, inter alia in packs of 20 tablets of 10 mg. In the Netherlands, that medicinal product is marketed by Novartis Pharma BV under the trade mark ‘Ritalin’, inter alia in packs of 30 tablets of 10 mg.

Sandoz BV places on the market in the Netherlands the generic medicinal product ‘Methylphenidate HC1 Sandoz 10 mg’ in packaging of 30 tablets.

According to the referring court, the medicinal products marketed under the names ‘Methylphenidate HC1 Sandoz 10 mg tablet’ and ‘Ritalin 10 mg tablet’ are identical.

By letter of 30 June 2015, PI Pharma informed Novartis Pharma NV of its intention to import from the Netherlands and to place on the Belgian market the medicinal product ‘Rilatine 10 mg x 20 tablets’. It is apparent from the order for reference that that medicinal product was, in actual fact, the medicinal product ‘Methylphenidate HC1 Sandoz 10 mg’, in new outer packaging on which PI Pharma intended to affix the trade mark ‘Rilatine’.

In a letter of 22 July 2015, Novartis stated its opposition to the parallel import planned by PI Pharma, claiming that a new marking of the medicinal product ‘Methylphenidate HC1 Sandoz 10 mg’ with the trade mark of the reference medicinal product of Novartis, that is to say, the trade mark ‘Rilatine’, manifestly infringed its rights in that trade mark and was likely to mislead the public.

In October 2016, PI Pharma marketed that repackaged medicinal product in Belgium in new packaging bearing the trade mark ‘Rilatine’.

The referring court states that, in Belgium, the public price of the medicinal product ‘Rilatine 10 mg x 20 tablets Novartis’ is EUR 8.10 (EUR 0.405 per tablet) and the price of the medicinal product ‘Rilatine 10 mg x 20 tablets PI Pharma’ is EUR 7.95 (EUR 0.398 per tablet), while in the Netherlands the public price of the medicinal product ‘Methylphenidate HC1 Sandoz 10 mg’ is EUR 0.055 per tablet.

Claiming that the marketing referred to in paragraph 28 above infringed its trade mark rights, on 28 July 2017, Novartis brought an action against PI Pharma before the Court of Cessations, Brussels.

Factors common to the disputes in the main proceedings

By two judgments of 12 April 2018, the Court of Cessations, Brussels held that the two actions referred to in paragraphs 21 and 30 above were well founded on the ground, inter alia, that the practice of affixing the trade marks ‘Femara’ and ‘Rilatine’ respectively to the repackaged generic medicinal products ‘Letrozol Sandoz 2.5 mg’ and ‘Methylphenidate HC1 Sandoz 10 mg’, imported from the Netherlands, infringed the trade mark rights of Novartis, for the purposes, respectively, of Article 9(2)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009 and of Article 2.20(1)(a) of the Benelux Convention. Consequently, the Court of Cessations, Brussels ordered that that practice be discontinued.

Impexeco and PI Pharma, respectively, appealed against those two judgments before the referring court.

Before that court, they argue that the practices of using different packaging and different trade marks for the same product both contribute to the partitioning of Member States’ markets and, therefore, have the same adverse effect on trade within the European Union.

Relying on paragraphs 38 to 40 of the judgment of 12 October 1999, Upjohn (C‑379/97, EU:C:1999:494), Impexeco and PI Pharma submit that the opposition of the proprietor of a trade mark to the reaffixing of a trade mark by a parallel importer constitutes an obstacle to intra-Community trade creating artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States, where such reaffixing is necessary in order for the products concerned to be marketed by that importer in the importing Member State. That case-law can be applied to a situation in which a generic medicinal product is given a new marking by affixing the trade mark of the reference medicinal product, where those medicinal products have been placed on the market in the EEA by economically linked undertakings.

Novartis submits that, under Article 13(1) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 2.23(3) of the Benelux Convention, the rights conferred by a trade mark may be exhausted only in respect of goods which have been placed on the market in the EEA ‘under that trade mark’ by the proprietor or with its consent, and not where a parallel importer gives the goods concerned a new marking.

Taking the view, in those circumstances, that the disputes pending before it raise questions of interpretation of EU law, the hof van beroep te Brussel (Court of Appeal, Brussels, Belgium) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions, which are worded identically in Cases C‑253/20 and C‑254/20, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

(1) Must Articles 34 to 36 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that, where a branded medicine (reference medicine) and a generic medicine have been put on the market in the EEA by economically linked undertakings, a trade mark proprietor’s opposition to the further commercialisation of the generic medicine by a parallel importer after the repackaging of that generic medicine by the affixing to it of the trade mark of the branded medicine (reference medicine) in the country of importation may lead to an artificial partitioning of the markets of the Member States?

(2) If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, must the trade mark proprietor’s opposition to that [new marking] be assessed by reference to the … conditions [set out in paragraph 79 of the judgment of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others (C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282)]?

(3) Is it relevant to the answer to those questions that the generic medicine and the branded medicine (reference medicine) are identical or have the same therapeutic effect as referred to in Article 3(2) of the … Royal Decree of 19 April 2001 on parallel imports [of medicinal products for human use and the parallel distribution of medicinal products for human and veterinary use, as amended by the Royal Decree of 21 January 2011]?’

The EU Court decision:

Article 9(2) and Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark, as amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015, and Article 5(1) and Article 7 of Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, read in the light of Articles 34 and 36 TFEU,

must be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of the trade mark of a reference medicinal product and the trade mark of a generic medicinal product may oppose the placing on the market of a Member State, by a parallel importer, of that generic medicinal product imported from another Member State, where that medicinal product has been repackaged in new outer packaging to which the trade mark of the corresponding reference medicinal product has been affixed, unless, first, the two medicinal products are identical in all respects and, second, the replacement of the trade mark satisfies the conditions laid down in paragraph 79 of the judgment of 11 July 1996, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others (C‑427/93, C‑429/93 and C‑436/93, EU:C:1996:282); in paragraph 32 of the judgment of 26 April 2007, Boehringer Ingelheim and Others (C‑348/04, EU:C:2007:249); and in paragraph 28 of the judgment of 17 May 2018, Junek Europ-Vertrieb (C‑642/16, EU:C:2018:322).

Amazon may be liable for trademark infringement after a European Court decision

The European Court has ruled in joined cases C‑148/21 et C‑184/21, Christian Louboutin v Amazon. 

The main issue that focuses our attention, in this case, is whether Amazon can be liable for unauthorized use of trademarks shown in ads of third parties.

As it is well-known, Amazon is the biggest online retailer in the world offering a myriad of goods, directly or through third parties that use Amazon’s platform to sell their products.

The problem arises when these third parties offer fake goods bearing trademarks of other companies without permission and promote them through Amazon ads.

Several months ago, the Advocate General of the EU Court Maciej Szpunar gave its opinion that in such a situation Amazon is not liable for ads that infringe other trademarks, because the company does to use these marks itself.

The European Court, however, disagreed with the Advocate General, and conclude that Amazon may be liable for trademark infringement related to such ads.

The reason for this is the fact that Amazon itself uses ads to promote the same, but original, goods. These ads are very similar to those used by third parties but for fake goods. Thus it is difficult for consumers to make a distinction between the ads which in turn can lead to misleading about the fact that the fake goods can originate from Amazon. From that perspective, Amazon can be held liable for unauthorized trademark use.

In addition, the possible confusion between the ads is enhanced by the fact that Amazon is often involved in the storage, shipping, and management of returns for third-party products on its sites.

Source: Marks & Clerk – Megan Rannard for Lexology.

Using a trademark as a decorative element is not the best option for its protection in the EU

The General Court of the European Union has ruled in the case T‑323/21 Castel Frères v Shanghai Panati Co., which reminds us how essential is one registered mark to be used correctly in order for its protection to be viable.

The case has the following background:

On 29 May 2018, Shanghai Panati Co filed an application with EUIPO for revocation of the EU trademark that had been registered further to an application filed on 17 March 2008 for the following figurative sign:

The goods covered by the contested mark, in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought, were inter alia in Class 33 of the Nice Agreement: ‘Still wines’.

The ground relied on in support of the application for revocation was the lack of genuine use of the contested mark within a continuous period of five years.

Evidence was submitted by Castel Frères that the mark was used for wine labels in the following way:

On 3 April 2020, the Cancellation Division rejected the application for revocation.

On 24 April 2020, Shanghai Panati Co. filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal upheld the appeal and revoked the contested mark. The Board of Appeal found, in essence, that the differences between the contested mark and the mark as used were such as to alter the distinctive character of the contested mark.

The Court upheld this decision.

According to the Court, it must be borne in mind that the contested mark in its registered form is a figurative mark consisting of three characters from the Chinese alphabet. As the Board of Appeal correctly notes the relevant public will not be able to verbalise or to memorise those Chinese characters, which will rather be perceived as meaningless, abstract signs or as decorative elements referring to China or to Asia. It is appropriate, therefore, to find that, with regard to the goods at issue, the Chinese characters forming the contested mark have a lower-than-average degree of distinctive character.

In that regard, it must be emphasised that on the product packaging or in the advertisements, the contested mark, which appears in a very small size, is almost systematically accompanied by the word elements ‘dragon de chine’ and by the representation of a dragon, which appear together and are very close to one another. Moreover, in so far as the contested mark is composed of three characters from the Chinese alphabet, in a very small size, the added elements are always clearly visible and dominate the overall impression.

The Board of Appeal was therefore right to find that the contested mark as used, that is to say, in an ancillary position and in a much smaller size than the distinctive and dominant word elements ‘dragon de chine’ and the representation of a dragon, would be perceived by the relevant public as a decorative element and not as an indication of origin of the goods.

That finding cannot be called into question by the argument that, in essence, it is common in the wine sector for two or more trademarks to be used jointly and autonomously on labels, with or without the name of the manufacturer’s company, as is the case here with the mark Dragon de Chine. It must be stated that the word elements ‘dragon de chine’ are always clearly visible in that they occupy a dominant position in the overall impression created by the mark as used. In any event, even if it were established that those elements are a trademark, the fact remains that that is not capable of weakening the alteration by those terms of the distinctive character of the contested mark, since the relevant public no longer perceives those three characters from the Chinese alphabet as an indication of the origin of the goods in question, in accordance with the case-law.

Having regard to the above examination of the distinctive and dominant character of the added elements, based on the intrinsic qualities of each of those elements and on the relative position of the various elements, it must be held that the variations in use demonstrated alter the distinctive character of the contested mark as registered, as the Board of Appeal rightly found.

This decision comes to remind us that one trademark should always be used as an indication of trade origin and not as a complimentary or decorative element. In a similar case, Apple lost a dispute regarding its trademark Think Differently because of the way the mark was used on the package of the product.