Broadcasting background music on planes can be a copyright issue according to the EU Court

The European Court has ruled in joined cases C‑775/21 и C‑826/21, Blue Air Aviation SA v UCMR — ADA Asociaţia pentru Drepturi de Autor a Compozitorilor.

These disputes concern whether broadcasting music in planes and trains can constitute communication to the public from a copyright point of view. The cases have the following background:

Case C‑775/21

The UCMR – ADA is a collective management organisation which handles music copyright.

On 2 March 2018, that body brought an action before the Regional Court, Bucharest, Romania against the air transport company Blue Air, seeking payment of remuneration still due and of penalties for the communication to the public of musical works on board aircraft operated by Blue Air, for which Blue Air had not obtained a licence.

Before that court, Blue Air submitted that it operates 28 aircraft and that, although it has the software necessary for the broadcasting of musical works in 22 of those 28 aircraft, it communicated to the public, after obtaining the required licence, only one musical work as background music, in 14 of those aircraft.

Following those clarifications, the UCMR – ADA expanded its requests for payment, taking the view that the existence of sound systems in approximately 22 aircraft justified the conclusion that protected works had been communicated to the public in all of the aircraft of Blue Air’s fleet.

By judgment of 8 April 2019, the UCMR – ADA’s action was upheld. In essence, the Regional Court, Bucharest held, on the basis of the judgments of 7 December 2006, SGAE (C‑306/05, EU:C:2006:764), and of 15 March 2012, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) (C‑162/10, EU:C:2012:141), that the fact that Blue Air equipped the means of transport operated by it with devices enabling the communication to the public of musical works as background music gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that those works were used; this required it to be held that any aircraft equipped with a sound system uses that device for the communication of the musical work in question to the public, without any further proof being necessary in that regard.

Blue Air appealed against that decision to the Court of Appeal, Bucharest, Romania, which is the referring court, submitting, inter alia, that it had not communicated background music on board the aircraft it operates for which no licence had been obtained, and that the mere existence of physical facilities did not amount to a communication to the public of musical works. It added that, through the broadcasting of background music, it was not pursuing any profit motive. Lastly, it stated that the existence of sound systems in aircraft is dictated by safety reasons, in order to enable communication between members of the air crew and communication between that crew and the passengers.

The referring court states that the question whether, given the absence of a profit-making objective, the communication of a musical work as background music constitutes a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2001/29, is not without uncertainty. Furthermore, if that question is answered in the affirmative, the referring court raises the question of the standard of proof required in that regard. It notes that, in accordance with the case-law of certain national courts, where an establishment carrying out a particular economic activity is cited in the methodology referred to in paragraph 23 of the present judgment, there is a rebuttable presumption that works protected by copyright are communicated to the public in that place. Such a presumption would be justified, in particular, by the fact that it is impossible for collective management organisations handling copyright systematically to monitor all the places where acts of use of works of intellectual creation could take place.

In those circumstances the Court of Appeal, Bucharest decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC … be interpreted as meaning that the broadcasting, inside a commercial aircraft occupied by passengers, of a musical work or a fragment of a musical work on take-off, on landing or at any time during a flight, via the aircraft’s public address system, constitutes a communication to the public within the meaning of that provision, particularly (but not exclusively) in the light of the criterion relating to the profit-making objective of the communication?

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative:

(2) Does the existence on board the aircraft of an address system required by air traffic safety legislation constitute a sufficient basis for making a rebuttable presumption as to the communication to the public of musical works on board that aircraft?

If the answer to that question is in the negative:

(3) Does the presence on board the aircraft of an address system required by air traffic safety legislation and of software which enables the communication of phonograms (containing protected musical works) via that system constitute a sufficient basis for making a rebuttable presumption as to the communication to the public of musical works on board that aircraft?’

Case C‑826/21

The UPFR is a collective management organisation handling the related rights of phonogram producers.

On 2 December 2013, that body brought an action against the CFR, a rail transport company, seeking payment of remuneration still due and of penalties for the communication to the public of musical works on board passenger carriages operated by the CFR. It maintained, in that context, that the applicable railway legislation required some of the trains operated by the CFR to be equipped with sound systems and argued that the presence of such systems amounted to communication to the public of works within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29.

That action was dismissed by the Regional Court, Bucharest, which held that while the mere installation of a sound system which makes public access to sound recordings technically possible constitutes a communication to the public of musical works, it had not been proved that the trains in service had been equipped with such a system.

The UPFR brought an appeal against that decision before the Curtea de Apel Bucureşti (Court of Appeal, Bucharest), which is the referring court.

The referring court notes that, in national case-law, it is the majority view, inter alia on the basis of the judgment of 7 December 2006, SGAE (C‑306/05, EU:C:2006:764), that the presence of sound systems in a train carriage amounts to a communication to the public of musical works. However, the referring court is uncertain in that regard.

In those circumstances the Court of Appeal, Bucharest decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Does a rail carrier which uses train carriages in which sound systems intended for the communication of information to passengers are installed thereby make a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC …?

(2) Does Article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC … preclude national legislation which establishes a rebuttable presumption of communication to the public on the basis of the existence of sound systems, where those sound systems are required by other provisions of law governing the carrier’s activity?’

The Court’s decision:

1. Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society

must be interpreted as meaning that the broadcasting, in a means of passenger transport, of a musical work as background music constitutes a communication to the public within the meaning of that provision.

2. Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property

must be interpreted as meaning that the installation, on board a means of transport, of sound equipment, and, where appropriate, of software enabling the broadcasting of background music, does not constitute a communication to the public within the meaning of those provisions.

3. Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115

must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, as interpreted by the national courts, which establishes a rebuttable presumption that musical works are communicated to the public because of the presence of sound systems in means of transport.

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The US Copyright Office refused copyright protection over AI-generated images

AI has become a really trendy topic in recent years. With the emergence of AI tools such as Chat GPT, DeepAI, and DALL-E 2 many people have started to realize how useful AI could be for their daily life.

Such innovations although creating fun and excitement have the potential to create a lot of disturbance when it comes to future job replacements or some moral and legal issues.

One interesting case, in that regard, is reported by the IPKat blog. It focuses our attention on an attempt by Ms. Kristina Kashtanova to register her comic book “Zarya of the Dawn” with the US Copyright Office. The procedure requires the relevant work to be an original author’s creating product of creative efforts.

The US Copyright Office refused to register the images part of this comic book because there were generated through the Ai tool Midjourney. The use of the Ai wasn’t disclosed in the application but the Office found evidence that the images are produced with the help of Midjourney.

For the creation of these images, Midjourney requires human input in the form of basic instructions. They represent tokens for the training of date based on which the images are created. However, the end result is unpredictable, it relies entirely on the AI algorithms without any further human interactions and creative modifications. This is in contrast with tools such as Photoshop where the author can interact and modify the image based on his or her creative vision.

Taking all of that into account, the Office considered the Ai generated images as not original works because the author cannot influence their creation apart from the initial basic instructions.

It is quite clear that such issues will become more and more widespread considering the ongoing implementation of new and new AI tools. What is not completely clear is how the law will catch up with these new trends which are putting us in front of new challenges.

Source: IPKat.

Access to personal data in case of copyright infringements in the EU

The Advocate General of the European Court M. SZPUNAR has issue an opinion in the case C‑470/21 La Quadrature du Net, Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet associatifs, Franciliens.net, French Data Network v Premier ministre, Ministère de la Culture.

The dispute concerns the scope of access to personal data in case of copyright infringements on the internet. The case has the following background:

By application of 12 August 2019 and two supplementary submissions of 12 November 2019 and 6 May 2021, La Quadrature du Net, the Fédération des fournisseurs d’accès à Internet associatifs, Franciliens.net and French Data Network brought an action before the Council of State for annulment of the implied decision by which the Prime Minister, France rejected their application for the repeal of the Decree of 5 March 2010, even though, in their view, that decree and the provisions constituting its legal basis unreasonably interfere with the rights guaranteed by the French Constitution and, in addition, infringe Article 15 of Directive 2002/58 and Articles 7, 8, 11, and 52 of the Charter.

In particular, the applicants in the main proceedings argue that the Decree of 5 March 2010 and the provisions constituting its legal basis permit access to connection data in a manner which is disproportionate to minor copyright infringements committed online, without prior review by a court or an authority offering guarantees of independence and impartiality.

In that regard, the referring court states, first of all, that the Court, in its most recent judgment in La Quadrature du Net and Others, held that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, does not preclude legislative measures which, for the purposes of safeguarding national security, combating crime and safeguarding public security, provide for the general and indiscriminate retention of data relating to the civil identity of users of electronic communications systems. Thus, such retention is permissible, without any specific time limit being imposed, for the purposes of investigating, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences in general.

The referring court infers from this that the plea raised by the applicants in the main proceedings, alleging that the Decree of 5 March 2010 is unlawful because it was adopted in the context of action to combat minor offences, must therefore be dismissed.

Next, the referring court observes that the Court, in its judgment in Tele2 Sverige and Watson, held that Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58, read in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation governing the protection and security of traffic and location data, and more particularly, the access of the competent national authorities to retained data, where that access is not subject to a prior review by a court or an independent administrative authority.

It states that the Court, in its judgment in Tele2, made clear that, in order to ensure, in practice, that those conditions are fully respected, it is essential that access of the competent national authorities to retained data should, as a general rule, except in cases of validly established urgency, be subject to the requirement of a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body, and that the decision of that court or body should be made following a reasoned request by those authorities submitted, inter alia, within the framework of procedures for the prevention, detection or prosecution of crime.

The referring court points out that the Court recalled that requirement in its judgment in La Quadrature du Net and Others, concerning the real-time collection of connection data by the intelligence services, and in its judgment in Prokuratuur (Conditions of access to data relating to electronic communications), concerning national authorities’ access to connection data.

Finally, the referring court notes that, since its establishment in 2009, Hadopi has issued over 12.7 million recommendations to subscribers under the graduated response procedure provided for in Article L 331-25 of the CPI, of which 827 791 were issued in 2019 alone. To that end, the officials of Hadopi’s Committee for the protection of rights must be able to collect, each year, a considerable volume of data relating to the civil identity of the users concerned. The referring court considers that, given the volume of those recommendations, making such data collection subject to a prior review might make it impossible for recommendations to be issued at all.

In those circumstances, the Conseil d’État (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)  Are the civil identity data corresponding to an IP address included among the traffic and location data to which, in principle, the requirement [of] prior review by a court or an independent administrative entity [whose decisions are binding] applies?

(2) If the first question is answered in the affirmative, and having regard to the fact that the data relating to the civil identity of users, including their contact details, are not particularly sensitive data, is Directive [2002/58], read in the light of the [Charter], to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides for the collection of those data, corresponding to the IP addresses of users, by an administrative authority, without prior review by a court or an independent administrative entity [whose decisions are binding]?

(3)  If the second question is answered in the affirmative, and having regard to the fact that the data relating to civil identity are not particularly sensitive data, that only those data may be collected and they may be collected solely for the purposes of preventing failures to fulfil obligations which have been defined precisely, exhaustively and restrictively by national law, and that the systematic review of access to the data of each user by a court or a third-party administrative entity [whose decisions are binding] would be liable to jeopardise the fulfilment of the public service [mission] entrusted to the administrative authority which collects those data, which is itself independent, does [Directive 2002/58] preclude the review from being performed in an adapted fashion, for example as an automated review, as the case may be under the supervision of a department within the body which offers guarantees of independence and impartiality in relation to the officials who have the task of collecting the data?’

The Advocate’s opinion:

Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications), read in the light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which allows providers of electronic communications services to retain, and an administrative authority, responsible for protecting copyright and related rights against infringements of those rights committed on the internet, to access data which is limited to civil identity data corresponding to IP addresses, so that that authority can identify the holders of those addresses suspected of having committed those infringements and, if appropriate, take action against them, where that access is not subject to a prior review by a court or an independent administrative body, provided that those data are the only means of investigation enabling the person to whom that address was assigned at the time of the commission of the infringement to be identified.

Copyrights may be for losers but trademarks are not – Banksy won a trademark dispute

The well-known graffiti artist Banksy has received some positive news recently regarding his attempt to take advantage of the IP system while not liking it or at least the copyright in particular.

The case concerns the following registered EU trademark, representing graffiti art painted by Banksy, in classes 9, 16, 25, 28 и 41:

The mark was registered by Pest Control Office Limited, a company managing artists’ legal rights, taking into account that he is anonymous and is famous with that status apart from his exciting artworks.

Against this mark, a request for invalidation was filed by Full Colour Black Limited on the ground of lack of distinctive character and bad faith.

The EUIPO Cancelation division invalidated the mark finding that it was made in bad faith. The reason for this was the fact that because of his anonymity the artist was unable to rely on copyright protection. What’s more, he is famous for his statement that copyright is for losers.

In another article, Banksy says “Sometimes you go to work and it’s hard to know what to paint, but for the past few months I’ve been making stuff for the sole purpose of fulfilling trademark categories under EU law”.

The Office considered all of this as the only reason why the artist wanted to register a trademark for his art, which will give him a tool to control its commercial use.

According to the Office:

From an examination of the evidence filed by both parties, it would appear that, at the time of filing of the application for invalidity, the EUTM proprietor (or Banksy) had never actually marketed or sold any goods or services under the contested EUTM. Moreover, some of the EUTM proprietor’s webpage extracts dated in 2010-2011 state that ‘All images are made available to download for personal amusement only, thanks. Banksy does not endorse or profit from the sale of greeting cards, mugs, t-shirts, photo canvases etc. …’, ‘Banksy does not produce greeting cards or print photo-canvases….Please take anything from this site and make your own (non-commercial use only thanks)’ and ‘Banksy has never produced greeting cards, mugs or photo canvases of his work’. Therefore, there is no evidence that Banksy was actually producing, selling or providing any goods or services under the contested sign prior to the date of filing of the contested EUTM.

The first evidence of sales appears to have happened just before the date of filing of the present application for a declaration of invalidity.

Taking all of that the Office considered that the mark was filed in bad faith.

The Board of Appealed, however, disagreed. According to the Board, the conclusion of the Consolation division was subjective. Bad faith cannot be assumed only based on single statements that do not show the entire position of the artist.

The Board cannot follow this view. Although the protection under copyright law is definite and ends 70 years after the death of the author whereas trade mark protection can in principle be indefinite, this circumstance does not mean that the
filing of a trademark consisting of a creation protected under copyright law is automatically unlawful and circumvents the copyright law. As stated above under paragraph 27, the same artwork can be protected by copyright as well as by trademark law.

The assumption that the need of staying anonymous was the reason to opt out from copyright protection and go for trademark protection, as submitted by the Cancellation applicant, even if it would be correct, cannot justify a finding that the
EUTM proprietor had no intention to use the contested mark.

Finally, the statement ‘Copyright is for losers’ has no bearing at all on the case at hand. The contested decision does not reason sufficiently about its finding of bad faith. It mainly bases its final findings on the supposition that the EUTM proprietor could
only with difficulties preventing its artwork under copyright and on the fact that it started only on October 2019 to use its mark and with the purpose to maintain the contested mark but not to use it according to the essential functions of a trademark.

The contested decision bases its finding on wrong facts because it has not been shown that on October 2019 the EUTM proprietor stated to use the contested mark. In any event, the reasons furnished in the contested decision cannot explain nor indicate that at the relevant filing date the EUTM proprietor had not intended to use its mark

Proving ownership of intellectual property rights in case of infringements in the EU

The Advocate General of the European Union A. RANTOS has issued an opinion in the case C-628/21 TB, Castorama Polska Sp. z o.o., „Knor“ Sp. z o.o.

This dispute concerns when and to what extent IP ownership has to be proved in the process of collecting information for IP infringements on the territory of the EU. The case has the following background:

TB is a natural person who, through her online shops, markets decorative articles. In the context of her economic activity, she sells reproductions, produced mechanically by the applicant herself, with simple graphics, consisting of a limited number of colours and geometric figures and short sentences. In that regard, images A, B and C (‘the reproductions at issue’) contain, respectively, the following sentences: ‘Mój dom moje zasady’ (‘In my house, I make the rules’); ‘Nie ma ludzi idealnych a jednak jestem’ (‘Perfect persons do not exist, and yet I am one’) and ‘W naszym domu rano słychać tupot małych stopek. Zawsze pachnie pysznym ciastem. Mamy dużo obowiązków, mnóstwo zabawy i miłości’ (‘In our house, the sound of tiny feet can be heard. There is always the aroma of delicious cake. We have many obligations, much pleasure and much love’). TB claims to be the creator of the images which she reproduces, which in her contention are works for the purposes of the legislation on copyright.

Exact copies of images A and B, supplied by ‘Knor’ Sp. z o.o. (‘Knor’), are sold without TB’s consent in the ‘bricks and mortar’ shops and online shop of Castorama Polska Sp. z o.o. (‘Castorama’). Neither TB’s reproductions of those images nor the reproductions offered by Castorama indicate the author or the origin of those images. Castorama also sells reproductions, supplied by Knor, with identical wording to that of image C, but with certain differences in terms of their graphics and fonts. On 13 October 2020, TB gave notice to Castorama to cease and desist its infringements of the economic and moral copyright in the works created by her which that company was selling without her consent.

On 15 December 2020, TB brought an action before the Regional Court, Warsaw, the referring court, under Article 479¹¹³ of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the course of those proceedings, she requested Castorama and Knor to provide her with information, concerning the reproductions at issue, on the distribution networks and the quantity of goods received and ordered, a complete list of suppliers, the date on which the goods were placed on sale in Castorama’s ‘bricks and mortar’ shops and online shop, the quantity involved and the price derived from the sale of the goods, broken down into physical sales and online sales. TB relied on her economic and moral copyright in the reproductions at issue and stated that the information requested was necessary for the purpose of bringing an action for infringement of her copyright and, in the alternative, an action for damages for unfair competition.

Castorama contended that that request for information should be refused and, in the alternative, that the scope of the judicial decision should be as narrow as possible, strictly limited to works classified as such for the purposes of the legislation on copyright, and disputed the very possibility that the reproductions at issue might be classified as ‘works’. It also relied on the protection of business secrets and claimed that TB had not proved that she held the economic copyright in those reproductions. In Castorama’s contention, the intellectual works to which TB’s request refers are not original and TB has not proved that the ‘novelty’ condition was satisfied. Granting her request would amount to affording copyright protection to ideas and concepts, because the reproductions at issue belong to the current fashion for ‘simplified motivational artworks’ with trite sentences. Castorama maintained, moreover, that all the graphic elements of the reproductions at issue are trite and repetitive and are not distinguished in any original manner, as far as concerns composition, colours or the fonts used, from the other images available on the market.

In answer to those arguments, TB did not adduce any evidence to prove the existence of an intellectual property right in the reproductions at issue and calling for special knowledge (with a view to an expert report) in the field of graphics and design. The evidence which she produced in her application of 15 December 2020 consisted of printouts of pages of articles on sale in her online shops and of sales invoices from 2014, and also of printouts of pages from Castorama’s websites and sales invoices of images in the latter’s online shops.

When examining TB’s request, the referring court was uncertain about the interpretation to be given to Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48, in particular as regards the question whether it is necessary to adduce proof of the legal nature of the asset to which the request for information relates, or merely to lend credence to it, in view of the fact that Articles 6 and 7 of that directive use different formulations and that Article 4 of that directive refers to the ‘holders of intellectual property rights’. The referring court’s doubts also related to the possibility that a different standard of proof might be applied as regards the status of the reproductions at issue, namely whether or not they are works, and consequently on TB’s standing to bring proceedings.

The referring court observes that Article 479¹¹³ of the Code of Civil Procedure constitutes the transposition of Article 8 of Directive 2004/48 and that Article 479⁸⁹ of that code, which defines the scope of intellectual property cases, refers, in paragraph 2(1), to cases relating to ‘the prevention and combating of unfair competition’. Referring to recital 13 of that directive, (5) the referring court emphasises that, for the purposes of the present case, although the Polish case-law has not yet given an unequivocal answer to that question, that court accepts the interpretation according to which national law extended, for domestic purposes, the application of that directive to acts involving unfair competition which consist in producing exact copies of goods, even if those goods are not the subject of exclusive rights such a those of the copyright holder. In the light of those factors, as regards the part of the request relating to images A and B, no problem of interpretation of EU law arises, since TB has proved that Castorama has sold reproductions consisting of exact copies of those images.

On the other hand, in order to adjudicate on the request relating to image C, it is necessary to interpret EU law, since the reproduction sold by Castorama is not an exact copy of that image, in that the text has been reproduced and its position on the page has been retained, but with the use of other graphic elements and other fonts. According to the Polish case-law, which coincides with the Court’s, (6) it is for the court dealing with the matter to examine the creative characteristics of a work. In that regard, according to the referring court, where the facts of the case are complex and the judge’s experience is insufficient, it is necessary to have recourse to an expert’s opinion, while the burden of proof and responsibility for requesting an expert report are generally borne by the applicant.

Polish legal commentators have expressed two contradictory viewpoints on the interpretation of Article 479¹¹³ of the Code of Civil Procedure and have considered either that the applicant must adduce proof that she is the holder of the intellectual property right in question or that she is not required to prove the infringement of the protected right, but is required merely to lend credence to such an infringement, since the request for information may also be addressed to a third party.

The referring court states that in its view Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48, read in conjunction with Article 4 of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that it refers to a measure to protect intellectual property rights only when the ownership of the intellectual property right is proved and that credence being lent to the fact that that measure relates to an existing intellectual property right is not sufficient, since it is necessary to adduce proof of that circumstance, in particular where the request for information on the origin and the distribution networks of goods or services precedes the assertion of claims for compensation on account of an infringement of intellectual property rights.

In those circumstances, the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Should Article 8(1) read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of [Directive 2004/48] be understood to refer to a measure to protect intellectual property rights only when the rightholder’s intellectual property right has been confirmed in these or other proceedings?

–   if Question (1) is answered in the negative:

(2) Should Article 8(1) …, read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of Directive [2004/48] be interpreted as meaning that it is sufficient to lend credence to the fact that that measure refers to an existing intellectual property right, and not to prove that circumstance, especially in a case where a request for information about the origin and distribution networks of goods or services precedes the assertion of claims for compensation on account of an infringement of intellectual property rights?’

The Advocate’s opinion:

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court of Justice should answer the questions for a preliminary ruling referred by the Sąd Okręgowy w Warszawie (Regional Court, Warsaw, Poland) as follows:

Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights

must be interpreted as meaning that in the context of an action relating to an infringement of an intellectual property right, the applicant must lend credence, by submitting sufficient evidence, to the fact that he or she is the holder of the intellectual property right in question, in particular where the request for information precedes the assertion of claims for compensation on account of the infringement of the intellectual property right. The national court must also assess the merits of that request and take due account of all the objective circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the parties, in order to ascertain, in particular, that the applicant has not abused that request.

The Spanish Supreme Court rules on cases targeting football matches, LaLiga, and IP rights

The Spanish Supreme Court has recently ruled on two lawsuits that concern the broadcasting of sports events and the relation to intellectual property rights.

In the first case, the Spanish Football Federation LaLiga sued two media Atresmedia S.A. and Mediaset S.A. for using images and video clips from football matches without permission in light of the fact that the rights for broadcasting of these matches were granted to another company.

According to the Supreme Court, every media has the right to record images and broadcast short news reports including football matches and this is not against the exclusive broadcasting rights for the same events because it is of public interest.

In the second case, The Supreme Court has ruled that broadcasting football matches in bars or restaurants without paying the corresponding fee to LaLiga is not an intellectual property crime. The reason is that football matches do not fit into the definition of copyrightable work, that is to say, they are not literary, artistic, or scientific works. The Court did not consider matches as a performance of creative works. Because of this, every possible infringement of football match broadcasting should be regarded as a market and consumer crime under Spanish legislation.

Source: EUIPO.

What should social media influencers know about intellectual property rights?

Nowadays one of the most popular ways to attract consumers’ attention in order to convince them to purchase your product or service is to use the so-called social media influencers.

The reason is that consumers pay less and less heed to the classic advertisement, finding it too boring or not trustworthy enough. After all, every ad tells you that the promoted subject matter is the best one.

On the other side, social media influencers in the first place are just normal people expressing their thoughts which in many cases attract like-minded people who start to follow and believe them with time.

Based on this a new marketing channel has emerged offering great potential for marketing and sales activities.

In most cases influence marketing starts without planning, the relevant influence suddenly discovers options for monetarization and if done properly it could be a successful business model.

However, every business needs to be well organized and manage its assets including the intangible ones such as all sorts of intellectual property rights.

Because I’m passionate about this I’ve created a new Skillshare class that will teach every new or established influencer how to deal with intellectual property rights, including copyrights, trademarks, designs, domain names, etc.

All of this is really important because if done right it can boost the influencer’s business while if done badly it can jeopardize it.

Just for example, if one influencer does not know how to secure copyrights over the materials used on his or her channel this can lead to legal conflicts with the copyright holders.

If a popular influencer missed the point to register a trademark, someone else can start using hir or her distinguishing name or sign for unfair competition, similar social media channels, etc.

Social media influencers generate value with their work, value that has to be managed properly in order to become a sustainable business model.

In this class you will learn:

• What types of social media influencers exist?
• Why do Influencers need to understand intellectual property?
• What intellectual property rights can belong to influencers?
• What copyrights belong to influencers and how can they be managed?
• What are the copyright rules of social media platforms for every uploaded content?
• What influencers can protect as trademarks?
• How can influencers protect internet domain names and what do they need to bear in mind?
• How design rights can be beneficial for influencers?
• What role do trade secrets play for influencers?
• How publicity rights can help influencers?

This class will give you the knowledge of how one social media influencer can organize and manage his or her intellectual property rights building a strong and sustainable business project.

In case you are interested, you can use this link to my Skillshare class: https://skl.sh/3FOUiuk 

Thanks for your interest!