Spotify won a trademark dispute against a cannabis app provider

Spotify won a trademark dispute in the US that has a slight tinge of marijuana.

The case concerns a trademark application for POTIFY by a small US company offering an app that connects users with firms that dispense and deliver cannabis.

Spotify, one of the largest music streaming companies in the world, filed an opposition based on earlier trademark SPOTIFY. According to the company, both signs were confusingly similar and what’s more, the mark applied for led to a trademark dilution by way of tarnishment and blurring.

The USPTO agreed with Spotify finding both marks confusingly similar due to clear visual and phonetic similarities. One letter difference was not enough to overcome this issue. According to the Office, dilution is possible too because of the clear association between the signs in the consumer’s mind.

The applicant’s arguments that their mark was created without relation to the famous brand, and that it focuses only on the term POT that is associated with the use of marijuana were dismissed.

The Office stated that taking into account the reputation of the earlier mark, it is highly unlikely that the owners of the cannabis app weren’t aware of the Spotify app service at all.

This dispute shows how risky such brand building can be. Although business areas can be different, a problem can arise again due to the established reputation of famous trademarks in the market.

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Miley Cyrus won a lawsuit in the EU regarding her name

The General Court of the European Union has ruled in case T‑368/20 Smiley Miley, Inc. v Cyrus Trademarks Ltd. This dispute started with a European trademark application for MILEY CYRUS in classes  9, 16, 28, 41 filed by Smiley Miley Inc. , a company owned by the famous pop singer Miley Cyrus.

Against this application an opposition was filed by Cyrus Trademarks Ltd based on the following earlier trademark for classes 9 and 20:

The EUIPO upheld partially the opposition concluding that both signs are confusingly similar. The reason for this was the fact that Cyrus was not common name and can be perceived as a short name for Miley Cyrus. In addition, earlier mark was included in its entirety in the later one with the presence of similar goods and services.

The decision was appealed.

The General Court disagreed with EUIPO and overturned the decision. According to the Court every mark has to be assessed in its entirety. From that perspective it is highly likely most of people to associate the mark applied for with the famous singer due to her global reputation.

Accordingly, the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the name of the famous American singer and actress, Miley Cyrus, of which the mark applied for consists, has no conceptual meaning.

As regards, next, the earlier mark CYRUS, it must be held that, contrary to what EUIPO claims, the fact that the name Cyrus is not a common surname does not necessarily support the inference, in the present case, that the relevant public will perceive that surname alone as the short version of the full name Miley Cyrus, thus identifying the same person. As has been stated in paragraph 37 above, Miley Cyrus markets her activities and performs on stage using her first name and surname taken together. By contrast, it has been neither suggested nor demonstrated that she has been known as a singer or actress by her surname alone. It is thus apparent that the fact that Miley Cyrus is well known, as a singer and actress, results from her first name and surname taken together, and not from her surname alone. Accordingly, the mere fact that that name is not common does not support the inference that the relevant public will perceive the word ‘cyrus’, taken alone, as referring to the famous singer and actress Miley Cyrus, who, according to the evidence before the Court, has specifically never used the name Cyrus in isolation in the course of her career. It must therefore be held that the earlier mark has no particular semantic meaning for the relevant public.

It thus follows from the foregoing considerations that the applicant is correct in claiming that the marks at issue are conceptually different and that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the conceptual comparison was neutral.

That is the case here. The mark applied for, MILEY CYRUS, has a clear and specific semantic content for the relevant public given that it refers to a public figure of international reputation, known by most well-informed, reasonably observant and circumspect persons, as has been pointed out in paragraph 51 above, whereas the earlier mark has no particular semantic meaning. Furthermore, the reputation of the singer and actress Miley Cyrus is such that it is not plausible to consider that, in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, the average consumer, confronted with the mark MILEY CYRUS designating the goods and services in question, will disregard the meaning of that sign as referring to the name of the famous singer and actress and perceive it principally as a mark, among other marks, of such goods and services (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 September 2020, EUIPO v Messi Cuccittini, C‑449/18 P and C‑474/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:722, paragraph 36).

It follows that the conceptual differences existing in the present case between the marks at issue are such as to counteract the visual and phonetic similarities set out.

This is another decision of the European Court that gives priority to the reputation of a celebrity in case of trademark similarity assessment. Recently there was a similar case with Lionel Messi and his European trademark.

Marshmello won a copyright lawsuit against DJ Arty

The well-known music producer and DJ Marshmello won a copyright lawsuit in the US regarding his track “Happier” created in collaboration with the pop band Bastille.

The lawsuit was initiated by the Russian DJ Arty who blamed Marshmello  on copyright infringement regarding his remix of a song by One Republic. According to Arty  apart from using the original song he added his own music elements in the remix, elements that were been used by Marshmello  in his track “Happier”.

The Court disagreed. The reason for this was the fact that Arty signed a contract with Interscope for the One Republic’s song remix according to which he disclaimed any ownership or financial interest related to the remix.

Arty ‘s position was that this concerned only the One Republic part of the remix but not the additional music elements.

The Court dismissed this claim stating that the contract covers the entire remix not only part of it. There was no exceptions under the contract provisions that could suggest the Arty obligations concerned only part of the final work.

Source: WIPR.

Ariana Grande lost a trademark dispute in Japan

The company GrandAri Inc that manages Ariana Grande’s trademarks lost a dispute in Japan.

The case concerns a trademark application for ARIANNA filed by Arianna Co. Ltd for Class 3 – cosmetics, soaps, and detergents and Class 10 – medical apparatus.

GrandAri Inc filed an opposition against this application based on an earlier international trademark for ARIANA GRANDE for Class 3 – Perfume; eau de perfume; fragranced body care preparations, namely, body lotions, body scrubs.

According to the company, both marks were highly similar due to the element Ariana in the earlier mark which was dominant one. Because Ariana Grande was a celebrity its fans often call her just Ariana. Sometimes the merchandising products with its trademark were referred only as Ariana.

GrandAri Inc stated that the pop star was very famous in Japan because of which it was possible the consumers to be confused when it comes to the later mark ARIANNA. One letter difference was not enough to overcome this negative possibility.

The Japan Patent Office dismissed the opposition in its entirety. According to the Office, although Ariana Grande is very famous celebrity in the country, there were not sufficient evidence that her first name ARIANA served as a source of trade origin alone apart for the whole trademark Ariana Grande. The Office stressed the need trademarks to be evaluated in their entirety not only part of them.

From that perspective, the Office considered both signs dissimilar and not confusing for the consumers in Japan.

Source: Masaki MIKAMI – Marks IP Law Firm.

Phonograms and equitable compensation – an EU Court decision

The European Court has ruled in case  C‑147/19 Atresmedia Corporación de Medios de Comunicación S.A. v Asociación de Gestión de Derechos Intelectuales (AGEDI), Artistas Intérpretes o Ejecutantes, Sociedad de Gestión de España (AIE).

On 29 July 2010, AGEDI and AIE brought an action before the Commercial Court, Madrid, Spain against Atresmedia seeking payment of compensation in respect of acts of communication to the public of phonograms published for commercial purposes, or reproductions of those phonograms, carried out between 1 June 2003 and 31 December 2009 via the television channels operated by Atresmedia, and for the unauthorised reproduction of phonograms in connection with those acts of communication to the public.

Since that action was declared unfounded by the Commercial Court, Madrid, AGEDI and AIE brought an appeal against that court’s judgment before the Provincial Court, Madrid, Spain, which set aside that judgment and upheld their application in its entirety.

Atresmedia brought an appeal on a point of law before the referring court against the judgment of the Provincial Court, Madrid.

The referring court notes that the appeal relates exclusively to whether the communication to the public of audiovisual works carried out by Atresmedia via its television channels gives rise to the right to the single equitable remuneration provided for in Spanish law in Article 108(4) and Article 116(2) of the LPI, which correspond, in EU law, to Article 8(2) of Directive 92/100 and to Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115. In particular, that court states that it falls to it to determine whether, from the moment when a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of that phonogram, has been incorporated or ‘synchronised’ in an audiovisual recording containing the fixation of an audiovisual work, the performers and phonogram producers concerned may demand that single equitable remuneration.

The referring court adds that since AGEDI and AIE claim compensation from Atresmedia in respect of the communication to the public of audiovisual works carried out between 1 June 2003 and 31 December 2009, both Directive 92/100 and Directive 2006/115 are applicable rationae temporis to the main proceedings.

In those circumstances the Supreme Court, Spain decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)  Does the concept of the “reproduction of a phonogram published for commercial purposes” referred to in Article 8(2) of Directives 92/100 and 2006/115 include the reproduction of a phonogram published for commercial purposes in an audiovisual recording containing the fixation of an audiovisual work?

(2) In the event that the answer to the previous question is in the affirmative, is a television broadcasting organisation which, for any type of communication to the public, uses an audiovisual recording containing the fixation of a cinematographic or audiovisual work in which a phonogram published for commercial purposes has been reproduced, under an obligation to pay the single equitable remuneration provided for in Article 8(2) of the aforementioned directives?’

The Court’s decision:

Article 8(2) of Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property and Article 8(2) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property must be interpreted as meaning that the single equitable remuneration referred to in those provisions must not be paid by the user where he or she makes a communication to the public of an audiovisual recording containing the fixation of an audiovisual work in which a phonogram or a reproduction of that phonogram has been incorporated.

Copyrights over music samples – a hot EU Court decision

The European Court has ruled in the case C‑476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Haas v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben. The case background is as follow:

Hütter and another are members of the group Kraftwerk. In 1977, that group published a phonogram featuring the song ‘Metall auf Metall’.

Mr Pelham and Mr Haas composed the song ‘Nur mir’, which was released on phonograms recorded by Pelham GmbH in 1997.

Hütter and another submit that Pelham electronically copied (‘sampled’) approximately 2 seconds of a rhythm sequence from the song ‘Metall auf Metall’ and used that sample in a continuous loop in the song ‘Nur mir’, although it would have been possible for them to play the adopted rhythm sequence themselves.

As the phonogram producers, Hütter and another’s principal claim is that Pelham infringed their copyright-related right. In the alternative, they claim that their intellectual property right as performers and Mr Hütter’s copyright in the musical work were infringed. In the further alternative, they claim that Pelham infringed competition law.

Hütter and another brought an action before the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) seeking a prohibitory injunction, damages, the provision of information and the surrender of the phonograms for the purposes of their destruction.

That court upheld the action, and Pelham’s appeal before the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) was dismissed. Following an appeal on a point of law (Revision) brought by Pelham before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), the judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg) was overturned and the case was referred back to that court for re-examination. That court dismissed Pelham’s appeal a second time. In a judgment of 13 December 2012, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) once again dismissed Pelham’s appeal on a point of law. That judgment was overturned by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany), which referred the case back to the referring court.

The referring court notes that the outcome of the Revision proceedings turns on the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 and of Article 9(1)(b) and Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115.

According to the referring court, it must, in the first place, be determined whether, by using Hütter and another’s sound recording in the production of its own phonogram, Pelham encroached on the exclusive right of Hütter and another to reproduce and distribute the phonogram featuring the song ‘Metall auf Metall’, as laid down in Paragraph 85(1) of the UrhG, which transposes Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 9 of Directive 2006/115. In particular, it must be determined whether such an infringement can be found where, as in the present case, 2 seconds of a rhythm sequence are taken from a phonogram then transferred to another phonogram, and whether that amounts to a copy of another phonogram within the meaning of Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115.

In the second place, if it is found that there has been an infringement of the phonogram producer’s right, the question arises of whether Pelham may rely on the ‘right to free use’, laid down in Paragraph 24(1) of the UrhG, which is applicable by analogy to the phonogram producer’s right, according to which an independent work created in the free use of the work of another person may be published or exploited without the consent of the author of the work used. The referring court notes, in that context, that that provision has no express equivalent in EU law and therefore asks whether that right is consistent with EU law in the light of the fact that that provision limits the scope of protection of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right to reproduce and distribute his or her phonogram.

In the third place, the national law exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right referred to in Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and to the distribution right referred to in Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115 are based on Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115. However, the referring court harbours doubts as to the interpretation of those provisions in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In the fourth place, the referring court notes that EU law must be interpreted and applied in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). In that context, it asks whether the Member States have any discretion for the purposes of the transposition into national law of Article 2(c) and Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and of Article 9(1)(b) and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115. The referring court notes that, according to case-law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), national legislation which transposes an EU directive must be measured, as a rule, not against the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) of 23 May 1949 (BGBl. 1949 I, p. 1), but solely against the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, where that directive does not allow the Member States any discretion in its transposition. That court also harbours doubts as to the interpretation of those fundamental rights in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)  Is there an infringement of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right under Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 to reproduce its phonogram if very short audio snatches are taken from its phonogram and transferred to another phonogram?

(2)  Is a phonogram which contains very short audio snatches transferred from another phonogram a copy of the other phonogram within the meaning of Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115?

(3)  Can the Member States enact a provision which — in the manner of Paragraph 24(1) of [the UrhG] — inherently limits the scope of protection of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right to reproduce (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29) and to distribute (Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) its phonogram in such a way that an independent work created in free use of its phonogram may be exploited without the phonogram producer’s consent?

(4)  Can it be said that a work or other subject matter is being used for quotation purposes within the meaning of Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 if it is not evident that another person’s work or another person’s subject matter is being used?

(5) Do the provisions of EU law on the reproduction right and the distribution right of the phonogram producer (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) and the exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115) allow any latitude in terms of implementation in national law?

(6)  In what way are the fundamental rights set out in [the Charter] to be taken into account when ascertaining the scope of protection of the exclusive right of the phonogram producer to reproduce (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29) and to distribute (Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) its phonogram and the scope of the exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115)?’

The Court’s decision:

1.  Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, must, in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that the phonogram producer’s exclusive right under that provision to reproduce and distribute his or her phonogram allows him to prevent another person from taking a sound sample, even if very short, of his or her phonogram for the purposes of including that sample in another phonogram, unless that sample is included in the phonogram in a modified form unrecognisable to the ear.

2.  Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property must be interpreted as meaning that a phonogram which contains sound samples transferred from another phonogram does not constitute a ‘copy’, within the meaning of that provision, of that phonogram, since it does not reproduce all or a substantial part of that phonogram.

3.  A Member State cannot, in its national law, lay down an exception or limitation, other than those provided for in Article 5 of Directive 2001/29, to the phonogram producer’s right provided for in Article 2(c) of that directive.

4.  Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘quotations’, referred to in that provision, does not extend to a situation in which it is not possible to identify the work concerned by the quotation in question.

5.  Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as constituting a measure of full harmonisation of the corresponding substantive law.

Beats Electronics won a trademark case in the EU

The Board of Appeal of the EUIPO has ruled in a case regarding an application for the following European trademark applied for classes 9 (apparatus for recording, transmission or reproduction of sound or images), 35 (business management, business administration, market research services, export services), and 38 (telecommunication services, in particular mobile telephony, broadcasting of radio and television programmes):

Against this application, an opposition was filed by Beats Electronics based on the following earlier European trademarks for classes 9 (audio and video equipment including audio players, video players, media players, portable media players), 38 (providing online bulletin boards in the fields of media, music, video, film, book and television for the transmission of messages among users), and 41 (nightclub services, dance club services, provision of live entertainment and recorded entertainment) of the Nice Classification. EUTM 2 was for the same goods and services, with the addition of Class 42 (providing an interactive online network website, via electronic communication networks):

Initially, the EUIPO’s Opposition Division dismissed the opposition stating that there is no possibility for consumer confusion concerning both signs despite the identical and similar goods. The claim for trademarks with reputation by Beats Electronics was dismissed as not proved.

The decision was appealed and the Board of Appeal reversed it finding that the Opposition Division erred in its conclusions.

According to the the Board, both trademarks are similar and can create confusion amongst the consumers. The arguments behind this position were that both signs have similar visual elements as well as colors. The differences are not enough to overcome similarities. What’s more the earlier marks have a reputation on the market which was proved by the owner.

Source: Nedim Malovic, IPKat.