Neymar won a dispute about his name in EU

brazil-germany-1201762_960_720.jpgThe well-known Brazilian footballer Neymar has won a trademark dispute before the General Court of the European Union.

The case concerns a registered in 2012 European trademark NEYMAR in class 25  – Clothing, footwear, headgear, owned by Carlos Moreira.

The footballer filed a request for invalidation of this mark based on a claim that it is filed in bad faith.

The EUIPO invalidated the mark because of which Moreira appealed the decision.

The General Court confirmed the EUIPO conclusions that this sign has been filed in a bad faith.

According to the court, there were sufficient pieces of evidence that clearly showed the celebrity status of Neymar at the time when the application was filed. Because of his rising career, many football clubs have interest in him at that time. This generated serious media coverage.

In that regard, the Moreira’s claims that he didn’t know who Neymar was were dismissed.

Another negative point for Moreira was that at the moment when he filed an application for this trademark he did the same for another mark Iker Casillas which is the name of the former Real Madrid goalkeeper.

Source: WIPR.

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Vita as a white trademark in The EU

blueberry-1245702_960_720.jpgThe European Court has ruled in case T‑423/18 Fissler GmbH v EUIPO which concerns whether or not words describing colors can be registered as trademarks.

The background of the case is as follow:

On 27 September 2016, the applicant, Fissler GmbH, filed an application for registration of an EU a word trade mark for VITA.

The goods in respect of which registration was sought are:

– Class 7: ‘Food processors, electric; parts and accessories for the aforesaid goods’;

– Class 11: ‘Pressure cookers, electric; parts and accessories for the aforesaid goods’;

– Class 21: ‘Household or kitchen utensils and containers; cooking pot sets; pressure cookers, non-electric; parts and accessories for the aforesaid goods’.

By decision of 28 April 2017, the examiner refused registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods concerned on the grounds that it was descriptive and devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001).

On 20 June 2017, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO.

By decision of 28 March 2018 (‘the contested decision’), the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO dismissed the appeal. In the first place, as regards the relevant public, it found that the goods concerned were aimed above all at the general public, but also in part at a specialist public, for example chefs, and that the level of attention varied from average to high. It added that, as the mark applied for was a Swedish term, it was necessary to take into account the Swedish-speaking public in the European Union.

In the second place, as regards the descriptiveness of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal, first, pointed out that the sign vita is the definite plural form of the word ‘vit’, which means ‘white’ in Swedish. Next, it found that, for the purposes of applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, the question whether or not white was a common colour for those goods was not determinative. It was sufficient that those goods could exist in white and that the sign could be descriptive of them. After stating that the colour white was not the most common colour for ‘electronic and non-electronic’ (that is to say, electric and non-electric) pressure cookers and other household utensils, but that it was at least a fairly usual colour for those goods, it found that that showed that an average consumer would associate the goods concerned with the colour white and therefore found that the mark applied for was descriptive. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal pointed out that some kitchen utensils and household appliances are often referred to as ‘white goods’ in English and Swedish (‘vitvaror’). On the basis of an extract from the website which could be accessed via the internet address http://www.vitvara.n.nu/vad-ar-vitvaror, it deduced that some of the goods concerned, such as electric food processors or electric pressure cookers, could collectively be described as ‘white goods’. It stated that, even if that were not possible, because it is mainly large household appliances, like washing machines and dishwashers, which are described as ‘white goods’, it clearly demonstrated that the colour white was generally associated with household utensils. Lastly, it found that the mark applied for was purely descriptive.

In the third place, as regards the lack of distinctive character of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal found that the mark applied for would be understood by the relevant public as a simple statement of fact in the sense that the goods concerned were goods that were available in white. It concluded that that mark was purely descriptive and, consequently, had no distinctive character. It took the view that any manufacturer of food processors and cooking pot sets could manufacture its goods in white and that that mark was not therefore capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of other undertakings. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal rejected the applicant’s argument that there are other registered trade marks which consist solely of colours.

The General Court annulled the EUIPO’s decision with the following arguments:

In the present case, it must be stated that the colour white does not constitute an ‘intrinsic’ characteristic which is ‘inherent to the nature’ of the goods concerned (such as food processors, electric pressure cookers and household utensils), but a purely random and incidental aspect which only some of them may have and which does not, in any event, have any direct and immediate link with their nature. Such goods are available in a multitude of colours, among them the colour white, which is not more prevalent than the others. The Board of Appeal itself acknowledges this because the website that it mentions in paragraph 23 of the contested decision states that ‘these days, [household] utensils come in all colours’.

The mere fact that the goods concerned are more or less usually available in white, among other colours, is not disputed, but is irrelevant, since it is not ‘reasonable’ to believe that for that reason alone the colour white will actually be recognised by the relevant public as a description of an intrinsic characteristic which is inherent to the nature of those goods.

Consequently, neither of the two grounds relied upon by the Board of Appeal  is sufficient to establish that there is a sufficiently direct and specific link, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 above, between the term ‘vita’ in Swedish and the goods concerned. The Board of Appeal did not show that the relevant public, when faced with the mark applied for, would immediately perceive it, without further thought, as a description of those goods or of one of the intrinsic characteristics of those goods that is inherent to their nature.

Furthermore, in so far as the Board of Appeal inferred the lack of distinctive character of the mark applied for from its being understood as a simple statement of fact in the sense that the goods concerned are available in white, it must be held that the relevant Swedish-speaking public will not perceive a description of an intrinsic characteristic of the goods concerned in the mark applied for and will not be able to associate it directly with those goods. On the contrary, the term ‘vita’ requires some interpretation on the part of Swedish and Finnish consumers. Those consumers will not understand the mark applied for as a simple statement of fact according to which those goods are available in white, but rather as an indication of their origin. That is particularly so because that mark will be affixed to goods of any colour, and not only to those which are white.

The ground for refusal relied on in the present case cannot therefore preclude the mark applied for from being regarded by the relevant public as being capable of identifying the commercial origin of the goods in question and distinguishing them from those of other undertakings.

Kellogg lost an opposition against a UK brewery

pexels-photo-459280.jpegKellogg Company lost an opposition in The UK. The case concerns the trademark application for FRUIT LOOP filed by the local brewery Fuller for class 32 – Beer, ale, lager, stout and porter; non-alcoholic beers.

Against this mark, Kellogg invoked its rights over the early registered trademark with reputation FREET LOOPS for class 30 – Coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, artificial coffee; flour and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry and non-frozen confectionery; honey, treacle; yeast, bakingpowder; salt, mustard; vinegar, sauces (condiments); spices.

The opponent claims that it has reputation under the above mark in respect of “preparations made from cereals”. It claims that use of the mark in suit would take unfair advantage of its mark and use of it would ride upon the coat tails of the opponent’s reputation and marketing efforts which would provide an unfair advantage. Use of the mark in suit would also dilute the distinctiveness of its mark, and the association of the opponent’s product with use on alcoholic beverages is likely to cause detriment to its reputation.

The Patent Office disagreed dismissing the opposition. According to the Office, there was only a low level of similarity between both signs for dissimilar goods.

The key moment in the opposition was the claimed reputation of the earlier sign. According to the Office, it wasn’t proved sufficiently which to show that the mark had been used for a prolonged period in the UK in a way that consumers are aware for its high level of reputation.

Source: WIPR.

Whether Don Quijote de la Mancha relates to a PDO cheese?

pexels-photo-220112.jpegThe European Court has ruled in case C‑614/17 Fundación Consejo Regulador de la Denominación de Origen Protegida Queso Manchego v Industrial Quesera Cuquerella SL. This interesting case regards the issue of whether a geographical indication can be infringed by a graphical representation that can be related to it. In detail:

The Queso Manchego Foundation is responsible for managing and protecting the PDO ‘queso manchego’. On that basis, it brought an action against the defendants in the main proceedings before the Spanish court of first instance with jurisdiction to hear the case seeking a declaration that the labels used by IQC to identify and market the cheeses ‘Adarga de Oro’, ‘Super Rocinante’ and ‘Rocinante’, which are not covered by the PDO ‘queso manchego’, and the use of the words ‘Quesos Rocinante’ infringe the PDO ‘queso manchego’ because those labels and those words constitute an unlawful evocation of that PDO for the purpose of Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 510/2006.

The Spanish court of first instance dismissed that action on the ground that the signs and names used by IQC to market the cheeses which were not covered by the PDO ‘queso manchego’ were not visually or phonetically similar to the PDOs ‘queso manchego’ or ‘La Mancha’ and that the use of signs such as the name ‘Rocinante’ or the image of the literary character Don Quixote de La Mancha evoke the region of La Mancha (Spain) and not the cheese covered by the PDO ‘queso manchego’.

The Queso Manchego Foundation brought an appeal against that decision before the Audiencia Provincial de Albacete (Provincial Court, Albacete, Spain), which, by judgment of 28 October 2014, upheld the judgment at first instance. That court held that, for cheeses marketed by IQC which are not covered by the PDO ‘queso manchego’, the use of landscape and images typical of La Mancha on the labels of those cheeses leads consumers to think of the region of La Mancha but not necessarily of the cheese covered by the PDO ‘queso manchego’.

The applicant in the main proceedings brought an appeal against that judgment before the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain).

In its order for reference, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) sets out a number of factual considerations.

First of all, the referring court states that the word ‘manchego’ used in the PDO ‘queso manchego’ is the adjective which describes, in Spanish, the people and the products originating in the region of La Mancha. Next, it observes that the PDO ‘queso manchego’ covers cheeses made in the region of La Mancha from sheep’s milk in accordance with the traditional production, preparation and ageing requirements set out in the product specification of that PDO.

Moreover, the referring court states that Miguel de Cervantes set most of the story relating to the fictional character Don Quixote de La Mancha in the region of La Mancha. Don Quixote is also described by the referring court as having certain physical features and clothing similar to those of the character depicted on the figurative design on the label of the cheese ‘Adarga de Oro’. In that regard, the archaic word ‘adarga’ (small leather shield) is used in [Cervantes’] novel to describe the shield used by Don Quixote. In addition, the referring court notes that one of the names used by IQC for some of its cheeses is the name of the horse ridden by Don Quixote de La Mancha, namely ‘Rocinante’. The windmills which Don Quixote fights are a typical feature of the landscape of La Mancha. Landscapes featuring windmills and sheep appear on some of the labels used for the cheeses produced by IQC which are not covered by the PDO ‘queso manchego’ and in some of the illustrations on IQC’s website, which also advertises cheeses not covered by the PDO.

In those circumstances, the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must the evocation of a [PDO], prohibited by Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 510/2006 necessarily be brought about by the use of a name visually, phonetically or conceptually similar to the [PDO] or may it be brought about by the use of figurative signs evoking the [PDO]?

(2)  When the [PDO] is of a geographical nature (Article 2(1)(a) of Regulation No 510/2006) and when the products are the same or comparable, can the use of signs evoking the region with which a [PDO] is associated constitute evocation of the [PDO] itself, within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 510/2006, which is prohibited even when the user of those signs is a producer established in the region associated with the [PDO], but whose products are not protected by [that PDO] because they do not meet the requirements set out in the product specification, apart from the geographical provenance?

(3)  Must the concept of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, to whose perception the national court has to refer in order to assess whether there is “evocation” within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 510/2006, be understood to cover European consumers or can it cover only consumers of the Member State in which the product giving rise to evocation of the protected geographical indication is produced or with which the PDO is geographically associated and in which the product is mainly consumed?’

The Court’s decision:

1.  Article 13(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs must be interpreted as meaning that a registered name may be evoked through the use of figurative signs.

2. Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 510/2006 must be interpreted as meaning that the use of figurative signs evoking the geographical area with which a designation of origin, as referred to in Article 2(1)(a) of that regulation, is associated may constitute evocation of that designation, including where such figurative signs are used by a producer established in that region, but whose products, similar or comparable to those protected by the designation of origin, are not covered by it.

3.  The concept of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, to whose perception the national court has to refer in order to assess whether there is ‘evocation’ within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 510/2006, must be understood as covering European consumers, including consumers of the Member State in which the product giving rise to evocation of the protected name is made or with which that name is geographically associated and in which the product is mainly consumed.

Partial success for Cadbury over color trademarks dispute in the UK

night-photograph-starry-sky-night-sky-star-957040.jpegThe UKIPO has ruled in oppositions against the following trademark applications all for class 30, filed by Cadbury:

GB50000000003019362.jpg– № 3019361, with the following description: The colour purple (Pantone 2685C), as shown on the form of application, applied to the packaging of goods.

GB50000000003019362.jpg– № 3019362, with the following description: The colour purple (Pantone 2685C), as shown on the form of application, applied to the whole visible surface of the packaging of the goods.

GB50000000003019362.jpg– № 3025822, with the following description: The colour purple (Pantone 2685C), shown on the form of application.

Against these applications Nestle filed oppositions with the following arguments:

  • The reference in the description to a Pantone number is a necessary but not
    sufficient condition for the Application to comply with Section 1(1);
  • The reference in the description to something “being shown on the form of
    application” does not comply with the requirement of being self-contained,
    intelligible and/or accessible. The application form does not form part of the
    public register and those consulting the public register are unable to ascertain
    from that the nature of the material referred to in the description.
  • The reference in the description to something being “applied to the packaging
    of the goods” imports a reference to a means of configuration or
    representation which is not shown on the register and which may comprise a
    potentially limitless number of signs/means of representation.
  • The reference in the description to “the whole visible surface” is inherently
    ambiguous because the public and competitors will assume – and the
    applicant intends – that less than the whole visible surface is in fact meant by
    the words “whole visible surface” since products of this kind must of necessity
    bear words, logos and other elements of different colours on the surface of
    the packaging.

The UKIPO agreed that in the case of trademarks 3019361 and 3025822 their descriptions create ambiguity regarding what exactly these signs represent.

Regarding trademark 3019362, however, the UKIPO considered that the above-mentioned conclusion is not relevant because the trademark’s description gives an idea of what exactly trademark dimensions are.

Source: WIPR.

Tests, well-known trademarks and a European Court decision

pexels-photo-951233.jpegThe European Court has ruled in case C‑690/17 ÖKO-Test Verlag GmbH v Dr. Rudolf Liebe Nachf. GmbH & Co. KG. This case concerns the following:

ÖKO-Test Verlag is the owner of the following German and EU trademark for printed works and testing and information and consultation services.

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ÖKO-Test Verlag chooses different goods from the market and makes tests on them without consent from the relevant producers. After that, the results are published in the magazine issued by ÖKO-Test.

Sometimes these producers are invited to use the results from these tests for marketing purposes in which case they are allowed ÖKO-Test trademark on products’ packages under a license.

Dr. Liebe produces toothpaste. In 2005 this company signed a license agreement to use ÖKO-Test for its product which was subject to a test receiving a very good assessment.

In 2014, however, ÖKO-Test Verlag found that Dr. Liebe was still been using its trademark although that wasn’t allowed under the license.

Dr. Liebe disagreed and because of which a lawsuit followed.  The Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf  raised the following questions to the European court:

‘(1) Is there an unlawful use within the meaning of Article 9 (1), second sentence, (b) of [Regulation No 207/2009] or the second sentence of Article 5 (1) (a) 95] where:

  • the individual mark is affixed to a product for which the individual mark is not registered,
  • in the course of trade, the affixing of an individual mark by a third party is perceived as a “test mark”, that is to say, the product is manufactured and marketed by a third party not under the control of the proprietor of the trademark, but the holder of the mark has tested this product for certain qualities and based on this it has indicated in the test mark a certain result such as assessment,
  • and the individual mark is registered in particular for “informing and consulting consumers on the choice of goods and services, in particular through the use of test and research results and quality assessments”?

2. If the Court of Justice answers the first question in the negative:

  • Is there an unlawful use within the meaning of Article 9 (1) (c) of [Regulation No 207/2009] and of Article 5 (2) of [Directive 2008/95] if:
  • The individual mark is only known as the test mark described in point 1, and
  • the individual mark is used by a third person as a test mark? “

The Court’s decision:

1. Article 9 (1) (a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 and Article 5 (1) of Directive 2008/95 / EC must be interpreted as not authorizing the proprietor of an individual mark consisting of a test mark to opposes the affixing by a third party of a sign identical or similar to that mark on goods which are neither identical nor similar to the goods or services for which the mark in question is registered.

2. Article 9 (1) (c) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 5 (2) of Directive 2008/95 are to be interpreted as authorizing the proprietor of a mark consisting of a test mark, an individual mark with reputation to oppose the affixing by a third party of a sign identical with, or similar to, that mark to goods which are neither identical nor similar to those for which the mark in question is registered, provided that it is established that, by affixing this sign to the goods the third party takes unfair advantage of distinctive character or reputation of the same mark or damages the trademark without clear legal grounds for this. 

(Unofficial translation)

Formula E crashed in a case before the European Court of Justice

race-track-flag-2035566_960_720.jpgThe European Court has ruled in case C‑282/18 – The Green Effort Limited v Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA). Even though the case is simple, it clearly shows why every trademark owner has to stick to the deadlines given by the EUIPO.

The Case concerns the following:

The Green Effort acquired rights over the word mark Formula E, the application for registration of which was filed on 17 November 2010.

The goods and services in respect of which registration was sought are:

–        Class 25: ‘Clothing’;

–        Class 38: ‘Broadcasting by radio, television and satellite’;

–        Class 41: ‘Organization of sporting events’.

The EU trademark application was published on 3 December 2010 and the trade mark applied for was registered on 14 March 2011.

On 15 March 2016, Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA) filed an application for revocation of the contested mark for all the goods and services, pursuant to Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, now Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the ground that it had not been put to genuine use within a continuous period of five years.

On 21 March 2016, the Cancellation Division of EUIPO invited The Green Effort to submit, by 21 June 2016, proof of genuine use of the contested mark. Since that proof was submitted on 22 June 2016, in disregard of the time limit prescribed, it was not taken into account.

On 27 July 2016, The Green Effort filed an application for restitutio in integrum with the Cancellation Division of EUIPO in order have its rights to submit that proof re-established.

By decision of 8 September 2016, the Cancellation Division rejected the application and revoked the contested mark in its entirety.

On 5 October 2016, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

By the contested decision, the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO (‘the Board of Appeal’) dismissed the appeal.

In support of its decision, the Board of Appeal considered that neither the proprietor of the contested mark nor its representative showed that they had actually taken the utmost care to observe the time limit prescribed for submitting the documents proving genuine use of the contested mark. It took the view that, while there is evidence in the file of repeated attempts to send electronic communications and fax communications from The Green Effort to EUIPO, with respect to Spanish local time all communications were received on 22 June 2016, that is to say after the time limit prescribed had expired, since the explanations provided in that regard could not be regarded as ‘exceptional’.

Therefore, the Board of Appeal upheld the decision of the Cancellation Division to reject the application for restitutio in integrum, and, with regard to the application for revocation of the contested mark, it considered that, in the absence of any proof of genuine use in the European Union during the relevant period or of any indications of proper reasons for non-use, the rights acquired by The Green Effort had to be revoked in their entirety and deemed not to have had any effect as from 15 March 2016.

The Court dismissed the appeal by The Green Effort Limited considering that the EUIPO’s position on the matter is correct. The arguments are:

As set out in Article 4(4) of that decision, without prejudice to accurately establishing the date of notification, notification will be deemed to have taken place on the fifth calendar day following the day on which EUIPO placed the document in the user’s inbox.

That interpretation meets the requirements stemming from the principle of legal certainty by preventing a decision of the Board of Appeal from being called into question indefinitely, given that, if no access to the document concerned is requested after it has been placed in the recipient’s inbox, the notification is deemed to have taken place on the fifth calendar day after being so placed.

Therefore, since it is common ground that the representative of The Green Effort requested access to the contested decision on 19 September 2017, that he downloaded it and became aware of it on that same day, the General Court did not err in law in deciding that the time limit for bringing an action against the contested decision expired on 29 November 2017, that decision having been notified on 19 September 2017. Therefore, the ground of appeal alleging that the starting point of the time limit prescribed for bringing an action was wrongly determined must be rejected as unfounded.