The German Constitutional Court blocked the Unified Patent Court

The German Federal Constitutional Court  has ruled that the legislation for introducing of the Unified Patent Court (UPC) is not constitutional.

According to the Court, in this case there is a transfer of adjudication authorities from national to international level. This requires the law to be accepted with two-thirds majority in the Bundestag, which wasn’t happened.

It is possible this decision to put a spanner in the works for the UPC as a whole. Although the German Parliament can pass the legislation again, this will take time, time which can allow other countries to express their reluctance toward the UPC concept.

Source: WIPR.

 

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The General Court of the EU found similarity between trademarks for wine

The General Court of the European Union has ruled in case Case T‑239/19 Vinos de Arganza v Nordbrand Nordhausen GmbH. It concerns an attempt for registration of the following combined EU trademark for class 33 – wine:

Against this application, an opposition was filed based on an earlier German trademark BELCANTO for class 33 – Alcoholic beverages.

EUIPO upheld the opposition entirely. According to the Office, the goods for both marks were identical. From a visual point of view, both signs were similar to a low degree. Phonetically they were similar because of their end sounds. Conceptually both trademarks were neutral because they had no meaning for the German-speaking public.

The Court confirmed this decision.

What is interesting here is the fact that although the beginning of the marks has a bigger impact on such comparisons in the case at hand the different letters, in the beginning, weren’t able to overcome the entire possibility for consumer confusion between the signs.

The European Patent Office is ready to issue Unitary EU patents

The European Patent Office expressed its readiness to issue the so-called  Unitary EU patents.

The Unitary Patent is a patent granted by the EPO for which unitary effect can be registered with the EPO for the territory of the participating EU Member States.  This patent is crucial for competitiveness, growth, and innovation in Europe.

For the time being, the Unitary Patent is not officially in action because of a lawsuit before the German Supreme Court, which has to decide whether this patent protection is in line with the German constitution.

Another uncertainty is what will happen with the UK after Brexit. The problem arises from the fact that the British government is against any possibilities where the European Court can have jurisdiction over the UK even in the case of the Unitary Patent.

For more information here.

The Deutsche Telekom pink color trademark is under attack

The insurance company Lemonade initiated a legal proceeding against Deutsche Telekom. The reason for this is a claim by the German telecom that Lemonade uses the pink color for its marketing which infringes the Deutsche Telekom registered EU trademarks for that color.

As it is well-known, Deutsche Telekom has used pink and its different shades for its brands for many years.

According to Lemonade, this accusation is unacceptable because it tries to monopolize one of the main colors in the spectrum.  What’s more, the German telecom is not even in the same industry as Lemonade.

For the time being, Lemonade stoped to use this color for its activities.

Of course, when you have a well-known brand, especially in the case of colors, where the protection is not so stable and clear, every trademark owner tries to safeguard its brand value. The subtle moment in this approach is to what extent this can happen in reality.

Source: WIPR.

Google prevailed in a dispute against press publishers in the EU

The European court has rules in the case C‑299/17 VG Media Gesellschaft zur Verwertung der Urheber- und Leistungsschutzrechte von Medienunternehmen mbH v Google LLC.

The case concerns the following:

VG Media is a collective management organisation, authorised in Germany, that defends copyright and rights related to copyright of television channels and private radio stations, as well as rights to digital editorial content. Against this background, VG Media concludes with rights holders the ‘administration agreement for television, radio and publishers’, in which those rights holders grant it, for exclusive administration, their current rights as well as those accruing to them during the term of the agreement, in respect of the newspapers or magazines produced by them.

Google operates several internet search engines including, in particular, the search engine of the same name, together with an automated news site (‘Google News’). On the ‘Google’ search engine, after the search term has been entered and the search function has been initiated, a short text or text excerpt (‘the Snippet’) appears with a thumbnail image that is intended to enable users to gauge the relevance of the displayed website in the light of the information they are looking for. As regards the news site ‘Google News’, it displays news from a limited number of news sources in a format akin to that of a magazine. The information on that site is collected by computers by means of an algorithm using a large number of sources of information. On that site, ‘the Snippet’ appears in the form of a short summary of the article from the website concerned, often containing the introductory sentences of that article.

In addition, Google publishes, by means of its online services, third-party advertisements on its own websites and on third party websites for a fee.

VG Media brought an action for damages against Google before the referring court in which it disputes, in essence, the use by Google, since 1 August 2013, of text excerpts, images and animated images produced by its members, without paying a fee in return for displaying search results and news summaries.

The referring court seeks to ascertain whether Paragraphs 87f and 87g of the UrhG are applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings. That court seeks guidance on whether those provisions, arising from the amendment, with effect from 1 August 2013, to the UrhG, should have been notified to the Commission during their drafting stage as foreseen in the first subparagraph of Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34. In that connection, the referring court relies on the case-law of the Court according to which the provisions adopted in breach of the duty of notification under that provision are inapplicable and are, therefore, unenforceable against individuals.

In those circumstances, the Landgericht Berlin (Regional Court, Berlin, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Does a national rule which prohibits only commercial operators of search engines and commercial service providers which edit content, but not other users, including commercial users, from making press products or parts thereof (excluding individual words and very short text excerpts) available to the public constitute, under Article 1(2) and (5) of [Directive 98/34], a rule which is not specifically aimed at the services defined in [Article 1(2)],

and, if that is not the case,

(2)  does a national rule which prohibits only commercial operators of search engines and commercial service providers which edit content, but not other users, including commercial users, from making press products or parts thereof (excluding individual words and very short text excerpts) available to the public constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of Article 1(11) of [Directive 98/34], namely a compulsory rule on the provision of a service?’

The Court’s decision:

Article 1(11) of Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services (as amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 1998), must be interpreted as meaning that a provision of national law, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits only commercial operators of search engines and commercial service providers that similarly publish content from making newspapers or magazines or parts thereof (excluding individual words and very short text excerpts) available to the public, constitutes a ‘technical regulation’ within the meaning of that provision, the draft of which is subject to prior notification to the Commission pursuant to the first subparagraph of Article 8(1) of Directive 98/34, as amended by Directive 98/48.

Balsamico and an Italian-German legal conflict

The Advocate General of the European Court G. HOGAN has issued his opinion in case C‑432/18 Consorzio Tutela Aceto Balsamico di Modena v BALEMA GmbH. The case concerns the following:

BALEMA GmbH produces vinegar-based products and markets them in the Baden region (Germany). For at least 25 years, it has been selling products under the designations ‘Balsamico’ and ‘Deutscher Balsamico’. The labels on its products bear the legend ‘Theo der Essigbrauer, Holzfassreifung, Deutscher Balsamico traditionell, naturtrüb aus badischen Weinen’ [Theo the vinegar brewer, matured in wooden barrels, German balsamic vinegar, traditional, naturally cloudy, made from Baden wine] or ‘1. Deutsches Essig-Brauhaus, Premium, 1868, Balsamico, Rezeptur No 3’ [first German vinegar brewery, premium, 1868, balsamic, recipe No 3].

It is agreed that BALEMA’s products designated as ‘Balsamico’ are not covered by the registration ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena (PGI)’ pursuant to Article 1 of and Annex I to Regulation No 583/2009 because they do not fulfill the product specifications contained in Annex II of that regulation.

Consorzio Tutela Aceto Balsamico di Modena (‘the Consorzio’) is a consortium of producers of the products designated by the name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’. It considers that BALEMA’s use of the designation ‘Balsamico’ infringes the protected geographical indication ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’. The Consorzio thus served a warning notice on BALEMA. BALEMA, in turn, brought an action in the German courts against the Consorzio seeking a negative declaration to the effect that there had been no trade mark infringement. That action was unsuccessful.

In the appeal on the merits, BALEMA sought a declaration that it is not obliged to refrain from using the designation ‘Balsamico’ for vinegar-based products produced in Germany. The appeal on the merits was upheld as the court considered that the use of the name ‘Balsamico’ in respect of vinegar did not infringe Article 13(1)(b) of Regulation No 1151/2012. According to that court, the protection for the name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’ granted by Regulation No 583/2009 was conferred only on the entire name and not on the non-geographical components of the term as a whole, even if used jointly.

The case was appealed to the referring court.

The referring court considers that the appeal on a point of law will succeed if the names ‘Balsamico’ and ‘Deutscher Balsamico’ used by BALEMA infringe Article 13(1)(a) or (b) of Regulation No 1151/2012. According to that court such a finding would require that the protection of the entire name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’ granted by Article 1 of Regulation No 583/2009 also covers the use of the individual non-geographical components of the term as a whole (‘Aceto’, ‘Balsamico’, ‘Aceto Balsamico’).

The Federal Court of Justice notes that it is clear from the second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012 and the case-law of the Court that, pursuant to Article 13(1)(a) or (b) of that regulation, a protected geographical indication that consists of several terms can be protected against not only the use of the entire indication, but also against the use of individual terms of that indication. The second subparagraph of Article 13(1) of Regulation No 1151/2012 governs the specific case in which a protected geographical indication contains within it the name of a product which is considered to be generic. That provision stipulates that the use of that generic name is not to be considered to be contrary to Article 13(1)(a) or (b) of that regulation. The Federal Court of Justice also refers to the fact that the Commission regulation registering the name may restrict the scope of the protection of a protected geographical indication that consists of several terms so that it does not cover the use of individual terms of that indication. In that regard, the fact that an applicant may state that it does not seek protection for all elements of a name shows that the protection granted by its registration can be restricted.

The Federal Court of Justice considers that recitals 3, 5 and 10 of Regulation No 583/2009 militate in favor of a restriction of the scope of protection to the name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’ as a whole, to the exclusion of individual non-geographical components. It also considers that, contrary to the view taken in the appeal on a point of law, the assumption that protection is granted to the name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’ as a whole did not give rise to an inconsistency with the registration of the protected designations of origin ‘Aceto balsamico tradizionale di Modena’ and ‘Aceto balsamico tradizionale di Reggio Emilia’. Contrary to Regulation No 583/2009, the references to a restricted scope of protection in Regulation No 813/2000, which may be attributable to the fact that there was no opposition by Member States pursuant to Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 (now Articles 51 and 52 of Regulation No 1151/2012) in the preceding registration procedure, does not preclude a restriction of the protective effect of the name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’ as a whole.

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘Does the protection of the entire name “Aceto Balsamico di Modena” extend to the use of the individual non-geographical components of the term as a whole (“Aceto”, “Balsamico”, “Aceto Balsamico”)?’

The Advocate’s position is:

The protection of the entire name ‘Aceto Balsamico di Modena’ under Commission Regulation (EC) No 583/2009 of 3 July 2009 does not extend to the use of the individual common words or non-geographical components, namely, ‘Aceto’, ‘Balsamico’ and ‘Aceto Balsamico’.

Copyrights over music samples – a hot EU Court decision

The European Court has ruled in the case C‑476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Haas v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben. The case background is as follow:

Hütter and another are members of the group Kraftwerk. In 1977, that group published a phonogram featuring the song ‘Metall auf Metall’.

Mr Pelham and Mr Haas composed the song ‘Nur mir’, which was released on phonograms recorded by Pelham GmbH in 1997.

Hütter and another submit that Pelham electronically copied (‘sampled’) approximately 2 seconds of a rhythm sequence from the song ‘Metall auf Metall’ and used that sample in a continuous loop in the song ‘Nur mir’, although it would have been possible for them to play the adopted rhythm sequence themselves.

As the phonogram producers, Hütter and another’s principal claim is that Pelham infringed their copyright-related right. In the alternative, they claim that their intellectual property right as performers and Mr Hütter’s copyright in the musical work were infringed. In the further alternative, they claim that Pelham infringed competition law.

Hütter and another brought an action before the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) seeking a prohibitory injunction, damages, the provision of information and the surrender of the phonograms for the purposes of their destruction.

That court upheld the action, and Pelham’s appeal before the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) was dismissed. Following an appeal on a point of law (Revision) brought by Pelham before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), the judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg) was overturned and the case was referred back to that court for re-examination. That court dismissed Pelham’s appeal a second time. In a judgment of 13 December 2012, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) once again dismissed Pelham’s appeal on a point of law. That judgment was overturned by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany), which referred the case back to the referring court.

The referring court notes that the outcome of the Revision proceedings turns on the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 and of Article 9(1)(b) and Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115.

According to the referring court, it must, in the first place, be determined whether, by using Hütter and another’s sound recording in the production of its own phonogram, Pelham encroached on the exclusive right of Hütter and another to reproduce and distribute the phonogram featuring the song ‘Metall auf Metall’, as laid down in Paragraph 85(1) of the UrhG, which transposes Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 9 of Directive 2006/115. In particular, it must be determined whether such an infringement can be found where, as in the present case, 2 seconds of a rhythm sequence are taken from a phonogram then transferred to another phonogram, and whether that amounts to a copy of another phonogram within the meaning of Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115.

In the second place, if it is found that there has been an infringement of the phonogram producer’s right, the question arises of whether Pelham may rely on the ‘right to free use’, laid down in Paragraph 24(1) of the UrhG, which is applicable by analogy to the phonogram producer’s right, according to which an independent work created in the free use of the work of another person may be published or exploited without the consent of the author of the work used. The referring court notes, in that context, that that provision has no express equivalent in EU law and therefore asks whether that right is consistent with EU law in the light of the fact that that provision limits the scope of protection of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right to reproduce and distribute his or her phonogram.

In the third place, the national law exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right referred to in Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and to the distribution right referred to in Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115 are based on Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115. However, the referring court harbours doubts as to the interpretation of those provisions in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In the fourth place, the referring court notes that EU law must be interpreted and applied in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). In that context, it asks whether the Member States have any discretion for the purposes of the transposition into national law of Article 2(c) and Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and of Article 9(1)(b) and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115. The referring court notes that, according to case-law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), national legislation which transposes an EU directive must be measured, as a rule, not against the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) of 23 May 1949 (BGBl. 1949 I, p. 1), but solely against the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, where that directive does not allow the Member States any discretion in its transposition. That court also harbours doubts as to the interpretation of those fundamental rights in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)  Is there an infringement of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right under Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 to reproduce its phonogram if very short audio snatches are taken from its phonogram and transferred to another phonogram?

(2)  Is a phonogram which contains very short audio snatches transferred from another phonogram a copy of the other phonogram within the meaning of Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115?

(3)  Can the Member States enact a provision which — in the manner of Paragraph 24(1) of [the UrhG] — inherently limits the scope of protection of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right to reproduce (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29) and to distribute (Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) its phonogram in such a way that an independent work created in free use of its phonogram may be exploited without the phonogram producer’s consent?

(4)  Can it be said that a work or other subject matter is being used for quotation purposes within the meaning of Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 if it is not evident that another person’s work or another person’s subject matter is being used?

(5) Do the provisions of EU law on the reproduction right and the distribution right of the phonogram producer (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) and the exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115) allow any latitude in terms of implementation in national law?

(6)  In what way are the fundamental rights set out in [the Charter] to be taken into account when ascertaining the scope of protection of the exclusive right of the phonogram producer to reproduce (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29) and to distribute (Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) its phonogram and the scope of the exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115)?’

The Court’s decision:

1.  Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, must, in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that the phonogram producer’s exclusive right under that provision to reproduce and distribute his or her phonogram allows him to prevent another person from taking a sound sample, even if very short, of his or her phonogram for the purposes of including that sample in another phonogram, unless that sample is included in the phonogram in a modified form unrecognisable to the ear.

2.  Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property must be interpreted as meaning that a phonogram which contains sound samples transferred from another phonogram does not constitute a ‘copy’, within the meaning of that provision, of that phonogram, since it does not reproduce all or a substantial part of that phonogram.

3.  A Member State cannot, in its national law, lay down an exception or limitation, other than those provided for in Article 5 of Directive 2001/29, to the phonogram producer’s right provided for in Article 2(c) of that directive.

4.  Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘quotations’, referred to in that provision, does not extend to a situation in which it is not possible to identify the work concerned by the quotation in question.

5.  Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as constituting a measure of full harmonisation of the corresponding substantive law.