Copyrights over music samples – a hot EU Court decision

pexels-photo-2381596.jpegThe European Court has ruled in the case C‑476/17 Pelham GmbH, Moses Pelham, Martin Haas v Ralf Hütter, Florian Schneider-Esleben. The case background is as follow:

Hütter and another are members of the group Kraftwerk. In 1977, that group published a phonogram featuring the song ‘Metall auf Metall’.

Mr Pelham and Mr Haas composed the song ‘Nur mir’, which was released on phonograms recorded by Pelham GmbH in 1997.

Hütter and another submit that Pelham electronically copied (‘sampled’) approximately 2 seconds of a rhythm sequence from the song ‘Metall auf Metall’ and used that sample in a continuous loop in the song ‘Nur mir’, although it would have been possible for them to play the adopted rhythm sequence themselves.

As the phonogram producers, Hütter and another’s principal claim is that Pelham infringed their copyright-related right. In the alternative, they claim that their intellectual property right as performers and Mr Hütter’s copyright in the musical work were infringed. In the further alternative, they claim that Pelham infringed competition law.

Hütter and another brought an action before the Landgericht Hamburg (Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) seeking a prohibitory injunction, damages, the provision of information and the surrender of the phonograms for the purposes of their destruction.

That court upheld the action, and Pelham’s appeal before the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany) was dismissed. Following an appeal on a point of law (Revision) brought by Pelham before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), the judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg) was overturned and the case was referred back to that court for re-examination. That court dismissed Pelham’s appeal a second time. In a judgment of 13 December 2012, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) once again dismissed Pelham’s appeal on a point of law. That judgment was overturned by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany), which referred the case back to the referring court.

The referring court notes that the outcome of the Revision proceedings turns on the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 and of Article 9(1)(b) and Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115.

According to the referring court, it must, in the first place, be determined whether, by using Hütter and another’s sound recording in the production of its own phonogram, Pelham encroached on the exclusive right of Hütter and another to reproduce and distribute the phonogram featuring the song ‘Metall auf Metall’, as laid down in Paragraph 85(1) of the UrhG, which transposes Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 9 of Directive 2006/115. In particular, it must be determined whether such an infringement can be found where, as in the present case, 2 seconds of a rhythm sequence are taken from a phonogram then transferred to another phonogram, and whether that amounts to a copy of another phonogram within the meaning of Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115.

In the second place, if it is found that there has been an infringement of the phonogram producer’s right, the question arises of whether Pelham may rely on the ‘right to free use’, laid down in Paragraph 24(1) of the UrhG, which is applicable by analogy to the phonogram producer’s right, according to which an independent work created in the free use of the work of another person may be published or exploited without the consent of the author of the work used. The referring court notes, in that context, that that provision has no express equivalent in EU law and therefore asks whether that right is consistent with EU law in the light of the fact that that provision limits the scope of protection of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right to reproduce and distribute his or her phonogram.

In the third place, the national law exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right referred to in Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and to the distribution right referred to in Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115 are based on Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115. However, the referring court harbours doubts as to the interpretation of those provisions in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In the fourth place, the referring court notes that EU law must be interpreted and applied in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). In that context, it asks whether the Member States have any discretion for the purposes of the transposition into national law of Article 2(c) and Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and of Article 9(1)(b) and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115. The referring court notes that, according to case-law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), national legislation which transposes an EU directive must be measured, as a rule, not against the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) of 23 May 1949 (BGBl. 1949 I, p. 1), but solely against the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, where that directive does not allow the Member States any discretion in its transposition. That court also harbours doubts as to the interpretation of those fundamental rights in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings.

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1)  Is there an infringement of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right under Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 to reproduce its phonogram if very short audio snatches are taken from its phonogram and transferred to another phonogram?

(2)  Is a phonogram which contains very short audio snatches transferred from another phonogram a copy of the other phonogram within the meaning of Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115?

(3)  Can the Member States enact a provision which — in the manner of Paragraph 24(1) of [the UrhG] — inherently limits the scope of protection of the phonogram producer’s exclusive right to reproduce (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29) and to distribute (Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) its phonogram in such a way that an independent work created in free use of its phonogram may be exploited without the phonogram producer’s consent?

(4)  Can it be said that a work or other subject matter is being used for quotation purposes within the meaning of Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 if it is not evident that another person’s work or another person’s subject matter is being used?

(5) Do the provisions of EU law on the reproduction right and the distribution right of the phonogram producer (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) and the exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115) allow any latitude in terms of implementation in national law?

(6)  In what way are the fundamental rights set out in [the Charter] to be taken into account when ascertaining the scope of protection of the exclusive right of the phonogram producer to reproduce (Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29) and to distribute (Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115) its phonogram and the scope of the exceptions or limitations to those rights (Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29 and the first paragraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2006/115)?’

The Court’s decision:

1.  Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, must, in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that the phonogram producer’s exclusive right under that provision to reproduce and distribute his or her phonogram allows him to prevent another person from taking a sound sample, even if very short, of his or her phonogram for the purposes of including that sample in another phonogram, unless that sample is included in the phonogram in a modified form unrecognisable to the ear.

2.  Article 9(1)(b) of Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property must be interpreted as meaning that a phonogram which contains sound samples transferred from another phonogram does not constitute a ‘copy’, within the meaning of that provision, of that phonogram, since it does not reproduce all or a substantial part of that phonogram.

3.  A Member State cannot, in its national law, lay down an exception or limitation, other than those provided for in Article 5 of Directive 2001/29, to the phonogram producer’s right provided for in Article 2(c) of that directive.

4.  Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘quotations’, referred to in that provision, does not extend to a situation in which it is not possible to identify the work concerned by the quotation in question.

5.  Article 2(c) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as constituting a measure of full harmonisation of the corresponding substantive law.

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Copyrighted works and media reports – a European Court’s decision

reporter-852096_960_720The European Court has ruled in case C‑516/17 Spiegel Online GmbH срещу Volker Beck, which in brief concerns the question to what extent media companies can use copyrighted works for news reporting. The background is as follow:

Mr Beck had been a member of the Bundestag (Federal Parliament, Germany) since 1994 at the time when the referring court decided to make a reference to the Court. He is the author of a manuscript on criminal policy relating to sexual offences committed against minors. That manuscript was published under a pseudonym in an article to a book published in 1988. At the time of publication, the publisher changed the title of the manuscript and shortened one of its sentences. By letter of 5 May 1988, the author raised an objection with the publisher and called on him, to no avail, to indicate that fact expressly when the book was distributed. Over the following years, Mr Beck, who was criticised for the statements contained in the article, repeatedly contended that the meaning of his manuscript had been altered by the publisher of the book. Mr Beck has distanced himself from the content of that article from at least 1993.

In 2013, Mr Beck’s manuscript was discovered in certain archives and was put to him on 17 September 2013 when he was a candidate in parliamentary elections in Germany. The following day, Mr Beck provided various newspaper editors with that manuscript in order to show that it had been amended by the publisher for the purposes of the publication of the article in question. He did not, however, give consent for the editors to publish the manuscript and article. Instead, he personally published them on his own website accompanied across each page by the statement ‘I dissociate myself from this contribution. Volker Beck’. The pages of the article published in the book in question additionally bore the words: ‘[The publication of] this text is unauthorised and has been distorted by the publisher’s editing at its discretion of the heading and body of the text’.

Spiegel Online operates the internet news portal Spiegel Online. On 20 September 2013, it published an article in which it contended that, contrary to Mr Beck’s claim, the central statement appearing in his manuscript had not been altered by the publisher and therefore that he had misled the public over a number of years. In addition to the article, the original versions of the manuscript and book contribution were available for download by means of hyperlinks.

Mr Beck brought an action before the Landgericht (Regional Court, Germany) challenging the making available of complete texts of the manuscript and article on Spiegel Online’s website, which he considers to be an infringement of copyright. That court upheld Mr Beck’s action. After its appeal was dismissed, Spiegel Online brought an appeal on a point of law (Revision) before the referring court.

That court considers that the interpretation of Article 5(3)(c) and (d) of Directive 2001/29, read in the light of fundamental rights, in particular of freedom of information and of freedom of the press, is not obvious. It asks inter alia whether that provision allows any discretion for the purposes of its transposition into national law. It notes in that regard that, according to the case-law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany), national legislation which transposes an EU directive must be measured, as a rule, not against the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany), of 23 May 1949 (BGBl 1949 I, p. 1), but solely against the fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, where that directive does not allow the Member States any discretion in its transposition.

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Do the provisions of EU law on the exceptions or limitations [to copyright] laid down in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29 allow any discretion in terms of implementation in national law?

(2) In what manner are the fundamental rights of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to be taken into account when determining the scope of the exceptions or limitations provided for in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29 to the exclusive right of authors to reproduce (Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29) and to communicate to the public their works, including the right to make their works available to the public (Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29)?

(3) Can the fundamental rights of freedom of information (second sentence of Article 11(1) of the Charter) or freedom of the press (Article 11(2) of the Charter) justify exceptions or limitations to the exclusive rights of authors to reproduce (Article 2(a) of Directive 2001/29) and communicate to the public their works, including the right to make their works available to the public (Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29), beyond the exceptions or limitations provided for in Article 5(3) of Directive 2001/29?

(4) Is the making available to the public of copyright-protected works on the web portal of a media organisation to be excluded from consideration as the reporting of current events not requiring permission as provided for in Article 5(3)(c), second case, of Directive 2001/29, because it was possible and reasonable for the media organisation to obtain the author’s consent before making his works available to the public?

(5) Is there no publication for quotation purposes under Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 if quoted textual works or parts thereof are not inextricably integrated into the new text — for example, by way of insertions or footnotes — but are made available to the public on the Internet by means of a link in [Portable Document Format (PDF)] files which can be downloaded independently of the new text?

(6)  In determining when a work has already been lawfully made available to the public within the meaning of Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29, should the focus be on whether that work in its specific form was published previously with the author’s consent?’

The Court’s decision:

1.  Article 5(3)(c), second case, and (d) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society must be interpreted as not constituting measures of full harmonisation of the scope of the exceptions or limitations which they contain.

2. Freedom of information and freedom of the press, enshrined in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are not capable of justifying, beyond the exceptions or limitations provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/29, a derogation from the author’s exclusive rights of reproduction and of communication to the public, referred to in Article 2(a) and Article 3(1) of that directive respectively.

3. In striking the balance which is incumbent on a national court between the exclusive rights of the author referred to in Article 2(a) and in Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 on the one hand, and, on the other, the rights of the users of protected subject matter referred to in Article 5(3)(c), second case, and (d) of that directive, the latter of which derogate from the former, a national court must, having regard to all the circumstances of the case before it, rely on an interpretation of those provisions which, whilst consistent with their wording and safeguarding their effectiveness, fully adheres to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

4. Article 5(3)(c), second case, of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as precluding a national rule restricting the application of the exception or limitation provided for in that provision in cases where it is not reasonably possible to make a prior request for authorisation with a view to the use of a protected work for the purposes of reporting current events.

5. Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘quotations’, referred to in that provision, covers a reference made by means of a hyperlink to a file which can be downloaded independently.

6.  Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as meaning that a work has already been lawfully made available to the public where that work, in its specific form, was previously made available to the public with the rightholder’s authorisation or in accordance with a non-contractual licence or statutory authorisation.

Tests, well-known trademarks and a European Court decision

pexels-photo-951233.jpegThe European Court has ruled in case C‑690/17 ÖKO-Test Verlag GmbH v Dr. Rudolf Liebe Nachf. GmbH & Co. KG. This case concerns the following:

ÖKO-Test Verlag is the owner of the following German and EU trademark for printed works and testing and information and consultation services.

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ÖKO-Test Verlag chooses different goods from the market and makes tests on them without consent from the relevant producers. After that, the results are published in the magazine issued by ÖKO-Test.

Sometimes these producers are invited to use the results from these tests for marketing purposes in which case they are allowed ÖKO-Test trademark on products’ packages under a license.

Dr. Liebe produces toothpaste. In 2005 this company signed a license agreement to use ÖKO-Test for its product which was subject to a test receiving a very good assessment.

In 2014, however, ÖKO-Test Verlag found that Dr. Liebe was still been using its trademark although that wasn’t allowed under the license.

Dr. Liebe disagreed and because of which a lawsuit followed.  The Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf  raised the following questions to the European court:

‘(1) Is there an unlawful use within the meaning of Article 9 (1), second sentence, (b) of [Regulation No 207/2009] or the second sentence of Article 5 (1) (a) 95] where:

  • the individual mark is affixed to a product for which the individual mark is not registered,
  • in the course of trade, the affixing of an individual mark by a third party is perceived as a “test mark”, that is to say, the product is manufactured and marketed by a third party not under the control of the proprietor of the trademark, but the holder of the mark has tested this product for certain qualities and based on this it has indicated in the test mark a certain result such as assessment,
  • and the individual mark is registered in particular for “informing and consulting consumers on the choice of goods and services, in particular through the use of test and research results and quality assessments”?

2. If the Court of Justice answers the first question in the negative:

  • Is there an unlawful use within the meaning of Article 9 (1) (c) of [Regulation No 207/2009] and of Article 5 (2) of [Directive 2008/95] if:
  • The individual mark is only known as the test mark described in point 1, and
  • the individual mark is used by a third person as a test mark? “

The Court’s decision:

1. Article 9 (1) (a) and (b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 and Article 5 (1) of Directive 2008/95 / EC must be interpreted as not authorizing the proprietor of an individual mark consisting of a test mark to opposes the affixing by a third party of a sign identical or similar to that mark on goods which are neither identical nor similar to the goods or services for which the mark in question is registered.

2. Article 9 (1) (c) of Regulation No 207/2009 and Article 5 (2) of Directive 2008/95 are to be interpreted as authorizing the proprietor of a mark consisting of a test mark, an individual mark with reputation to oppose the affixing by a third party of a sign identical with, or similar to, that mark to goods which are neither identical nor similar to those for which the mark in question is registered, provided that it is established that, by affixing this sign to the goods the third party takes unfair advantage of distinctive character or reputation of the same mark or damages the trademark without clear legal grounds for this. 

(Unofficial translation)

Huawei escaped a ban for selling its phones in Germany

technology-3033809_960_720The Chinese tech company Huawei will continue to sell its smartphones in Germany after reaching an agreement with the patent poll MPEG LA.

The dispute at hand concerns video coding technology used in computers and phones, for which there are patents included in the MPEG LA portfolio.

In 2018, the Court in Düsseldorf ruled in favor of MPEG LA ordering all  Huawei’s smartphones which are sold in Germany to be recalled and destroyed.

To prevent such results, Huawei signed a license agreement with MPEG LA that will allow the company to use the above-mentioned patents as well as to continue their selling in Germany.

Source: WIPR.

BMW won a lawsuit regarding its Mini Cooper brand

red-84593_960_720BMW won a lawsuit in Germany against the Chinese company Ninebot which offer electric scooters.

The case concerns an advertisement spot for the Ninebot’s scooter which includes among other a Mini Cooper car producing by BMW.

According to the German company, this was unfair trade practice because, first of all, Ninebot had no permission to include the Mini Cooper brand in the spot, and secondly, by doing that the company took unfair advantages from the longstanding Mini Cooper’s reputation on the market.

The court went along with BMW, accepting that the Mini Cooper brand was exposed clearly and in a non-descriptive manner in the advertisement.

Source: WIPR.

Breaking news – Images, schools, copyright and a hot European court decision

photo-1489486501123-5c1af10d0be6The European court has issued an important decision in case C‑161/17 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen срещу Dirk Renckhoff, which concerns the following:

Mr Renckhoff, the applicant who brought the proceedings before the Landgericht Hamburg (Hamburg Regional Court, Germany), is a photographer. Stadt Waltrop (City of Waltrop, Germany) which was originally the defendant at first instance, but which is no longer a party to the dispute in the main proceedings, has responsibility for the Gesamtschule Waltrop (Waltrop secondary school, ‘the school’). The Land of Nord Rhine-Westphalia, also a defendant at first instance, has responsibility for the educational supervision of the school and is the employer of the teaching staff working there.

From 25 March 2009, it was possible to access on the school website a presentation written by one of the school’s pupils as part of a language workshop it organised which included, by way of illustration, a photograph taken by Mr Renckhoff (‘the photographer’) that that pupil had downloaded from an online travel portal (‘the online travel portal’). The photograph was posted on the online travel portal without any restrictive measures preventing it from being downloaded. Below the photograph the pupil included a reference to that online portal.

Mr Renckhoff claims that he gave a right of use exclusively to the operators of the online travel portal and that the posting of the photograph on the school website infringes his copyright. He requested the court with jurisdiction at first instance to prohibit the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, on pain of a financial penalty, from reproducing/having reproduced and/or making available/having made available to the public the photo and, in the alternative, from allowing school students to reproduce the photo for purposes of posting it on the internet. He also claimed payment of damages from the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia of EUR 400.

Since Mr Renckhoff’s action was upheld in part, the Land of North Rhine- Westphalia was ordered to remove the photograph from the school website and to pay EUR 300 plus interest.

Both parties appealed against that judgment before the Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (Higher Regional Court, Hamburg, Germany), which held, inter alia, that the photograph was protected by copyright and that posting it on the school website was an infringement of the reproduction right and the right to make available to the public held by Mr Renckhoff. That court found that the fact that the photograph was already accessible to the public without restriction on the internet before the acts at issue was irrelevant, since the reproduction of the photograph on the server and the making available to the public on the school website which followed led to a ‘disconnection’ with the initial publication on the online travel portal.

Hearing an appeal on point of law, the referring court considers that the outcome of that appeal depends on the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. In particular, that court has doubts as to whether the requirement, laid down in the case-law, according to which the communication to the public concerned must have been made to a ‘new’ public has been satisfied.

In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) decided to stay proceedings and refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘Does the inclusion of a work — which is freely accessible to all internet users on a third-party website with the consent of the copyright holder — on a person’s own publicly accessible website constitute a making available of that work to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of [Directive 2001/29] if the work is first copied onto a server and is uploaded from there to that person’s own website?’

The Court’s decision:

The concept of ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, must be interpreted as meaning that it covers the posting on one website of a photograph previously posted, without any restriction preventing it from being downloaded and with the consent of the copyright holder, on another website.

Conclusions: This decision gives clarification on whether if you use a publicly available work from one website to another, this will constitute a copyright infringement. According to the court obviously, this is the case.

Image: Javier Quesada on Unsplash.

Audiobooks, parents, and copyright infringements

audiobook-3106985_960_720The Advocate General of the European Court M. SZPUNAR gave its opinion in case C‑149/17 Bastei Lübbe GmbH & Co. KG versus Michael Strotzer. The case concerns the following:

(not an official translation, by google translate)

As a producer of phonograms, Bastei Lübbe AG, a company incorporated under German law, is the holder of copyright and related rights in the audiobook.

Mr Michael Strotzer is the owner of an internet connection through which, on 8 May 2010, this audio recording was shared for downloading with an unlimited number of users on a peer-to-peer file sharing platform. An expert determines with precision that the IP address belongs to Mr Strotzer.

By letter of 28 October 2010, Bastei Lübbe invited Mr Strotzer to suspend the infringement of copyright. As the latter did not comply with that invitation, Bastei Lübbe brought an action before the Amtsgericht München (Munich Regional Court, Munich) for pecuniary damages against Mr Strotzer as the owner of the IP address in question.

Mr Strotzer, however, denies himself having infringed the copyright and maintains that his Internet connection is sufficiently protected. He further claims that his parents had access to the link in question but who, to the best of his knowledge, did not have the audiobook on their computer, did not know about it and did not use the online software file sharing. At the time of the infringement in question, the computer was disconnected.

The Amtsgericht München (District Court, Munich) dismissed the action for damages brought by Bastei Lübbe on the ground that Mr Strotzer could not be accepted as the perpetrator of the alleged copyright infringement because he indicated that his parents have committed this infringement. Bastei Lübbe appealed to the Landgericht München I (District Court, Munich I, Germany) – the referring court in the present case.

The referring court is inclined to accept that Mr Strotzer is liable as the perpetrator of the alleged infringement of copyright, as it does not follow from his explanations that at the time the infringement was committed the internet connection was used by a third party, which is very likely to be the perpetrator. However, the referring court faces difficulties with regard to the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) (Germany) case-law, in which it considers that the conviction of the defendant might contradict it.

It is true that, according to the case-law of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court), as interpreted by the referring court, the applicant is required to set out facts from a legal and factual point of view and has the burden of proving the infringement of copyright. Furthermore, the Bundesgerichtshof takes the view that there is a factual presumption that such an infringement was committed by the internet link holder since no other person was able to use that internet connection at the time of the infringement. However, if the internet connection is not sufficiently protected or deliberately provided for use by other persons at the time of the breach, there is no such factual presumption that the breach has been committed by the link holder.

In such cases, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) case-law nevertheless entrusts the holder of the internet connection with a secondary obligation to state the facts in law and in fact. The latter fulfills this secondary obligation when he points out that other persons whose identity may be revealing have separate access to his Internet connection and may therefore have allegedly infringed copyright. However, if a family member had access to the internet connection in question, its holder is not obliged to provide further details on the timing and use of this link in view of the protection of marriage and the family guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as “the Charter”) and the relevant provisions of German constitutional law.

In those circumstances, the Landgericht München I (District Court, Munich I) decided to stop the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Must Article 8 (1) and (2) in conjunction with Article 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29 be interpreted as meaning that penalties for infringements of the right to make a work available to the public continue to be’ dissuasive “and excluding liability for damage caused by an Internet connection owner through which Fileharing (” file sharing “) has been infringed if the Internet connection owner identifies at least one member of the family, which he had with him access to that Internet connection without, however, communicating more detailed details of the timing and use of the Internet by that member of the family by means of relevant studies?

2. Must Article 3 (2) of Directive 2004/48 be interpreted as meaning that measures for the enforcement of intellectual property rights continue to be ‘effective’ and where the liability for harm caused by an internet connection , which infringes copyright through Filesharing (“File Sharing”) if the Internet connection owner indicated at least one member of the family who, along with him, had access to that Internet connection but did not announced y by means of relevant studies, made more detailed details on the timing and use of the Internet by this family member? “

The Advocate General’s opinion:

‘Article 8 (2) of Directive 2001/29 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society and Article 13 (1) of Directive 2004/48 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights must be interpreted as not requiring in the domestic law of the Member States the introduction of a presumption of liability of the internet owner for infringements of the copyrights made through this connection. However, if domestic law provides for such a presumption in order to ensure the protection of those rights, that presumption must be applied consistently in order to ensure the effectiveness of the protection. The right to respect for family life recognized in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union cannot be interpreted in such a way as to deprive copyright holders of any real possibility of protecting their intellectual property rights enshrined in Article 17 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. “

снимка: sik-life / 95 images, Pixabay