Companies rely on IPRs are more prone to growth according to a new study

computer-767776_960_720EPO and EUIPO published a very interesting study called “High-growth firms
and intellectual property rights”.

This study tries to make a connection between the protection of intellectual property assets and the likelihood of a company’s growth.

According to the study:

SMEs that have filed at least one IPR are 21% more likely to experience a subsequent
growth period, and 10% more likely to become an HGF. The likelihood of experiencing a high growth period is 9% higher for SMEs that have filed at least one patent and 13% higher for those that have filed at least one trademark.

The likelihood of experiencing a high growth period is 17% higher for SMEs that have filed at least one European IPR. Filing a European IPR, therefore, provides a positive indicator of an SME’s readiness to scale up business to European level.

In high-tech industries, the likelihood of high growth is 110% higher for SMEs that have filed one or more European patents. Interestingly, the predictive power of European patents is particularly high in low-tech industries (+172%), where a patent filing can be a relatively rare event.

IP bundles involving trade marks systematically outperform other bundles and single IPR categories, thus suggesting that trademarks are the basic building block of effective IP bundles. This is likely due to the fact that a trademark registration is related to market entry and thus turnover growth.

The full text of the study can be found here.

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Be aware if someone tries to register your brand as a .eu domain

computer-3368242_960_720.jpgThe European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and the .eu and .ею domain registry manager EURid announced the launch of a new service which will help the fight against bad faith domain registrations.

Some people have taken advantage of early publication of EUTM applications and registered the EUTM as a .eu domain name in bad faith. Effectively reducing the risk of such cyber-squatting infringements requires adopting preventive actions such as raising awareness and pro-actively informing the EUTM holders.
 
As of 18 May, holders and applicants of a EUTM can opt-in to receive alerts as soon as a .eu domain name is registered that is identical to their EUTM (application). By receiving such alert, EUTM holders are informed much faster and may take appropriate action much sooner.

For more information here.

Neymar won a dispute about his name in EU

brazil-germany-1201762_960_720.jpgThe well-known Brazilian footballer Neymar has won a trademark dispute before the General Court of the European Union.

The case concerns a registered in 2012 European trademark NEYMAR in class 25  – Clothing, footwear, headgear, owned by Carlos Moreira.

The footballer filed a request for invalidation of this mark based on a claim that it is filed in bad faith.

The EUIPO invalidated the mark because of which Moreira appealed the decision.

The General Court confirmed the EUIPO conclusions that this sign has been filed in a bad faith.

According to the court, there were sufficient pieces of evidence that clearly showed the celebrity status of Neymar at the time when the application was filed. Because of his rising career, many football clubs have interest in him at that time. This generated serious media coverage.

In that regard, the Moreira’s claims that he didn’t know who Neymar was were dismissed.

Another negative point for Moreira was that at the moment when he filed an application for this trademark he did the same for another mark Iker Casillas which is the name of the former Real Madrid goalkeeper.

Source: WIPR.

Vita as a white trademark in The EU

blueberry-1245702_960_720.jpgThe European Court has ruled in case T‑423/18 Fissler GmbH v EUIPO which concerns whether or not words describing colors can be registered as trademarks.

The background of the case is as follow:

On 27 September 2016, the applicant, Fissler GmbH, filed an application for registration of an EU a word trade mark for VITA.

The goods in respect of which registration was sought are:

– Class 7: ‘Food processors, electric; parts and accessories for the aforesaid goods’;

– Class 11: ‘Pressure cookers, electric; parts and accessories for the aforesaid goods’;

– Class 21: ‘Household or kitchen utensils and containers; cooking pot sets; pressure cookers, non-electric; parts and accessories for the aforesaid goods’.

By decision of 28 April 2017, the examiner refused registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods concerned on the grounds that it was descriptive and devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001).

On 20 June 2017, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO.

By decision of 28 March 2018 (‘the contested decision’), the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO dismissed the appeal. In the first place, as regards the relevant public, it found that the goods concerned were aimed above all at the general public, but also in part at a specialist public, for example chefs, and that the level of attention varied from average to high. It added that, as the mark applied for was a Swedish term, it was necessary to take into account the Swedish-speaking public in the European Union.

In the second place, as regards the descriptiveness of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal, first, pointed out that the sign vita is the definite plural form of the word ‘vit’, which means ‘white’ in Swedish. Next, it found that, for the purposes of applying Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, the question whether or not white was a common colour for those goods was not determinative. It was sufficient that those goods could exist in white and that the sign could be descriptive of them. After stating that the colour white was not the most common colour for ‘electronic and non-electronic’ (that is to say, electric and non-electric) pressure cookers and other household utensils, but that it was at least a fairly usual colour for those goods, it found that that showed that an average consumer would associate the goods concerned with the colour white and therefore found that the mark applied for was descriptive. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal pointed out that some kitchen utensils and household appliances are often referred to as ‘white goods’ in English and Swedish (‘vitvaror’). On the basis of an extract from the website which could be accessed via the internet address http://www.vitvara.n.nu/vad-ar-vitvaror, it deduced that some of the goods concerned, such as electric food processors or electric pressure cookers, could collectively be described as ‘white goods’. It stated that, even if that were not possible, because it is mainly large household appliances, like washing machines and dishwashers, which are described as ‘white goods’, it clearly demonstrated that the colour white was generally associated with household utensils. Lastly, it found that the mark applied for was purely descriptive.

In the third place, as regards the lack of distinctive character of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal found that the mark applied for would be understood by the relevant public as a simple statement of fact in the sense that the goods concerned were goods that were available in white. It concluded that that mark was purely descriptive and, consequently, had no distinctive character. It took the view that any manufacturer of food processors and cooking pot sets could manufacture its goods in white and that that mark was not therefore capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of other undertakings. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal rejected the applicant’s argument that there are other registered trade marks which consist solely of colours.

The General Court annulled the EUIPO’s decision with the following arguments:

In the present case, it must be stated that the colour white does not constitute an ‘intrinsic’ characteristic which is ‘inherent to the nature’ of the goods concerned (such as food processors, electric pressure cookers and household utensils), but a purely random and incidental aspect which only some of them may have and which does not, in any event, have any direct and immediate link with their nature. Such goods are available in a multitude of colours, among them the colour white, which is not more prevalent than the others. The Board of Appeal itself acknowledges this because the website that it mentions in paragraph 23 of the contested decision states that ‘these days, [household] utensils come in all colours’.

The mere fact that the goods concerned are more or less usually available in white, among other colours, is not disputed, but is irrelevant, since it is not ‘reasonable’ to believe that for that reason alone the colour white will actually be recognised by the relevant public as a description of an intrinsic characteristic which is inherent to the nature of those goods.

Consequently, neither of the two grounds relied upon by the Board of Appeal  is sufficient to establish that there is a sufficiently direct and specific link, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 28 above, between the term ‘vita’ in Swedish and the goods concerned. The Board of Appeal did not show that the relevant public, when faced with the mark applied for, would immediately perceive it, without further thought, as a description of those goods or of one of the intrinsic characteristics of those goods that is inherent to their nature.

Furthermore, in so far as the Board of Appeal inferred the lack of distinctive character of the mark applied for from its being understood as a simple statement of fact in the sense that the goods concerned are available in white, it must be held that the relevant Swedish-speaking public will not perceive a description of an intrinsic characteristic of the goods concerned in the mark applied for and will not be able to associate it directly with those goods. On the contrary, the term ‘vita’ requires some interpretation on the part of Swedish and Finnish consumers. Those consumers will not understand the mark applied for as a simple statement of fact according to which those goods are available in white, but rather as an indication of their origin. That is particularly so because that mark will be affixed to goods of any colour, and not only to those which are white.

The ground for refusal relied on in the present case cannot therefore preclude the mark applied for from being regarded by the relevant public as being capable of identifying the commercial origin of the goods in question and distinguishing them from those of other undertakings.

The battle for ICELAND continues

pexels-photo-414101Iceland Foods will appeal the EUIPO’s decision for cancelation of its trademark ICELAND registered in 2014 for classes 7, 11, 16, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35. This trademark is used for supermarkets in The UK.

The procedure was initiated by Promote Island, a government organization from Iceland based on Article 52(1) EUTMR in conjunction with Article 7(1)(c) EUTMR:

The following shall not be registered:

  • (a) signs which do not conform to the requirements of Article 4;
  • (b) trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character;
  • (g) trade marks which are of such a nature as to deceive the public, for instance as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or service;

The EUIPO agreed with Promote Island and canceled the trademark. The arguments for this are:

It follows from all of the above that ‘ICELAND’ may serve, from the point of view of the public concerned, to designate an essential and desired characteristic of the goods and services.

Therefore, the mark conveys obvious and direct information regarding the geographical origin of the goods and services in question, and in some cases, the subject matter of the goods as well.

Considering all of the above, it follows that the link between the word ‘ICELAND’ and the contested goods and services is sufficiently close for the sign to fall within the scope of the prohibition laid down by Article 7(1)(c) EUTMR and Article 7(2) EUTMR and that this was also the situation at the time of filing of the contested EUTM, namely, 19/04/2002.

The EUIPO found that Iceland Food failed to prove acquired secondary distinctiveness in the EU.

The Icelandic foreign minister Gudlaugur Thór Thórdarson expressed his satisfaction with this decision.

“It is contrary to common sense for a foreign company to be able to appropriate the name of a sovereign state as was being done in this case”, the minister said.

Iceland’s foreign ministry added that consumers were likely to associate the mark with “the country of Iceland for all goods and services the registration is claimed for”.

Source: WIPR.

Formula E crashed in a case before the European Court of Justice

race-track-flag-2035566_960_720.jpgThe European Court has ruled in case C‑282/18 – The Green Effort Limited v Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA). Even though the case is simple, it clearly shows why every trademark owner has to stick to the deadlines given by the EUIPO.

The Case concerns the following:

The Green Effort acquired rights over the word mark Formula E, the application for registration of which was filed on 17 November 2010.

The goods and services in respect of which registration was sought are:

–        Class 25: ‘Clothing’;

–        Class 38: ‘Broadcasting by radio, television and satellite’;

–        Class 41: ‘Organization of sporting events’.

The EU trademark application was published on 3 December 2010 and the trade mark applied for was registered on 14 March 2011.

On 15 March 2016, Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA) filed an application for revocation of the contested mark for all the goods and services, pursuant to Article 51(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009, now Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the ground that it had not been put to genuine use within a continuous period of five years.

On 21 March 2016, the Cancellation Division of EUIPO invited The Green Effort to submit, by 21 June 2016, proof of genuine use of the contested mark. Since that proof was submitted on 22 June 2016, in disregard of the time limit prescribed, it was not taken into account.

On 27 July 2016, The Green Effort filed an application for restitutio in integrum with the Cancellation Division of EUIPO in order have its rights to submit that proof re-established.

By decision of 8 September 2016, the Cancellation Division rejected the application and revoked the contested mark in its entirety.

On 5 October 2016, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.

By the contested decision, the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO (‘the Board of Appeal’) dismissed the appeal.

In support of its decision, the Board of Appeal considered that neither the proprietor of the contested mark nor its representative showed that they had actually taken the utmost care to observe the time limit prescribed for submitting the documents proving genuine use of the contested mark. It took the view that, while there is evidence in the file of repeated attempts to send electronic communications and fax communications from The Green Effort to EUIPO, with respect to Spanish local time all communications were received on 22 June 2016, that is to say after the time limit prescribed had expired, since the explanations provided in that regard could not be regarded as ‘exceptional’.

Therefore, the Board of Appeal upheld the decision of the Cancellation Division to reject the application for restitutio in integrum, and, with regard to the application for revocation of the contested mark, it considered that, in the absence of any proof of genuine use in the European Union during the relevant period or of any indications of proper reasons for non-use, the rights acquired by The Green Effort had to be revoked in their entirety and deemed not to have had any effect as from 15 March 2016.

The Court dismissed the appeal by The Green Effort Limited considering that the EUIPO’s position on the matter is correct. The arguments are:

As set out in Article 4(4) of that decision, without prejudice to accurately establishing the date of notification, notification will be deemed to have taken place on the fifth calendar day following the day on which EUIPO placed the document in the user’s inbox.

That interpretation meets the requirements stemming from the principle of legal certainty by preventing a decision of the Board of Appeal from being called into question indefinitely, given that, if no access to the document concerned is requested after it has been placed in the recipient’s inbox, the notification is deemed to have taken place on the fifth calendar day after being so placed.

Therefore, since it is common ground that the representative of The Green Effort requested access to the contested decision on 19 September 2017, that he downloaded it and became aware of it on that same day, the General Court did not err in law in deciding that the time limit for bringing an action against the contested decision expired on 29 November 2017, that decision having been notified on 19 September 2017. Therefore, the ground of appeal alleging that the starting point of the time limit prescribed for bringing an action was wrongly determined must be rejected as unfounded.